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Migration – Society – Language

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ABSTRACTS



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Conference announcement

The conference brings together researchers in Caucasus studies for a discussion on current developments in the region. How are these dynamics to be understood and explained from political, anthropological, historical, linguistic and cultural perspectives?

Papers are organized into thematic sections, such as *Armed conflicts and migration*, *Migration and maintenance of cultural identities*, *Language contact and migration*, *Transitional identities*, *Caucasian diasporas*, *Caucasus in regional and global politics*. We welcome multidisciplinary papers and also encourage presentations of research in progress. The program includes possibilities for poster presentations.

The conference is organized by Caucasus Studies at the Department of International Migration and Ethnic Relations (IMER), Malmö University, Sweden, in cooperation with the Center for Caucasus Studies at Øresund University. The conference is supported by Sida (Swedish International Development Agency).

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Section 1. Armed conflicts and conflict resolution

External Forces in the Abkhazia and South Ossetia conflicts

Donnacha Ó Beacháin

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The war in Georgia that broke out in August 2008 has implications beyond the Caucasus and may be the opening salvos in a new Cold War between a resurgent Russia and an increasingly divided western alliance. Taking the war and its immediate aftermath as the starting point, my paper will work backwards to identify the causes of this conflict, paying particular attention to the influence of external forces on the conflict.

This paper will critically assess Russia's role in stimulating secessionism within Georgia's internationally recognised borders. An overview of Russia's policies towards Abkhazia and South Ossetia since the 1990s will be provided before examining Kremlin responses to the "Rose Revolution". Contrary to the assumption of many analysts, the paper will argue that Russian policy towards the conflict has been consistent throughout both the Shevardnadze and Saakashvili presidencies; what differed was a matter of degree rather than direction. Saakashvili's innovation prior to August 2008 was to take several measures designed to unfreeze the conflicts whereas the Shevardnadze regime had allowed matters to drift and was unable to use either carrot or stick due to the deficiencies of the chronically weak Georgian state. Tbilisi's new strategies for reconciling the issues of conflict resolution with maintenance of its territorial integrity brought it closer to conflict with the neo-imperial designs of the Russian state. Moreover, the transformation of the Georgian state from a weak failed state to a more robust political, economic and military entity challenged Moscow's interests in the region and increased the likelihood of conflict.

Secondly, the role of United States will be examined in terms of its support for the Saakashvili administration, militarily, financially and diplomatically. The value of Georgia post 9/11 in terms of its strategic and symbolic importance combined with the Bush administration's rhetorical commitment to 'global democracy' will help frame the evolution of US-Georgia relations. However, as with the case of Russia-Georgia relations, it will be argued that US priorities and policy towards Georgia have remained relatively constant throughout both the Shevardnadze and Saakashvili governments.

Thirdly the role of the European Union, which is generally neglected, will be explored. It is recognised that the EU, as a relatively neutral actor with enormous economic clout, has huge potential in making a positive impact on political developments in the former USSR. Moreover, the political, social and economic character of its neighbouring states is a matter of vital importance to the EU, not least because of the EU's energy dependency on post-soviet states.

Finally, the role of international bodies such as the OSCE and United Nations will be briefly examined. In particular the impact of the international community's recognition of an independent Kosovo will be inspected as will the attitude of NATO to Georgia's membership of that organisation.

The paper will be based on research conducted since 2000 in Georgia, Abkhazia, and South Ossetia.

Return to Abkhazia – reasons and conditions on the Georgians’ return to Gali district

Kirstine Borch Nielsen

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The paper reports from a 6 months’ stay in the Gali Region in Abkhazia, Georgia, working for the Danish Refugee Council.

Since the recognition of Kosovo, de-facto states around the world have gained new hope for their future status as independent and recognized states. In my thesis I discuss which factors give a territory or nation the right to a status as an internationally recognized state. One of the factors I will examine is demography. In Abkhazia, the return of internally displaced people to Gali remains at the centre of the peace negotiation process. Though Abkhaz authorities acknowledge that returnees partly hold the key to the support of the international community for economic development of the region, the returnees are also a political threat because their presence can tilt the ethnic balance in favour of the Georgian. At the moment the parties of the peace negotiation have only agreed on a return to the Gali District. Here the returnees live without any kind of protection. During my stay in the Gali region I gathered information on reasons for return among the Georgians returnees. Over 70 men and women have contributed to the data collection and together it shows a broad picture of the reasons for return by Georgians to Abkhazia. This information is very sensitive, but also very important in the discussion on Abkhazia’s future status.

Some of the other factors I will examine are the international political and economical interests in the area of concern, and the rhetoric used by the actors.

In Abkhazia I worked as a project coordinator on a UNHCR-funded pilot project regarding improvement of school attendance in the south Abkhazia. The education system in Abkhazia is in a state of collapse and is highly politicized and controversial issues range from the language of instruction to the use of Georgian or Abkhaz curricula. This job gave me an insight into the political and administrative problems Abkhazia is facing after 15 years of isolation. And through close cooperation with local and central administrators in both Abkhazia and Georgia I have been able to gather information from both sides of the conflict.

The Georgian-Russian conflict and the problem of s. c. South Ossetia

Merab Chukhua

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The paper deals with the viewpoint that Russia (of Tsarist and Bolshevik, as well) created the preconditions of a conflict situation in the form of so-called South Ossetian Autonomous formation in the territory of Georgia. All these begin in 1801, after abolishing the Kartl-Kakhetian Kingdom and forced unification with Russian Empire, the territories of a central Georgia, where Ossetians lived along with Georgians, in particular, the sources of the Didi and Patara Liakhvi, Tergi, Ksani and Jejori gorges were named as "Ossetia" and by the 1830s, previously non-existent territorial-administrative word-agreements "Severnaya Osetia" ("North Ossetia") and "Iyzhnaya Osetia" ("South Ossetia") were entered in the historical geographical dictionaries.

The geographic term "South Ossetia", created in the 19th century for the Shida Kartli, was given an administrative status by Bolshevik Russia after the forced annexation of the Georgian Democratic Republic, on 20th April, 1922,. Before this, in 1918-1921, Bolshevik Russia incited the Southern Ossetians to rebel against the Independent Georgian State several times.

It is noteworthy that the "North Ossetian Autonomous region" was formed in the Russian Federation later on, on 7th July 1924, and since the 1920s the process of settling (supported by Russia) by the Ossetians on the fruitful valleys of present-day Vladikavkaz, which was the only living-place of Ingushians, became intensive. And it is noteworthy that one more part of the Ingushetian republic, nearby Vladikavkaz, on the eastern bank of the river Tergi, when Russia illegally deported Ingushians to Siberia and Middle Asia, for some reasons it occurred in the constituent part of Ossetian Autonomous Republic and was not given back to Ingushians even after 1956, when they returned back to their home-land.

The similar situation is observable in connection with Georgia, when Bolshevik Russia cut off the Ardoni foundation pit (historical Magran-Dvaleti) from the annexed state by force and in 1922 North Ossetia was united with the Russian Federation.

Russia used this previously created artificial conflict situation skilfully against Georgia: in 1991, when democrat Mikheil Gorbachov threatened President Zviad Gamsakhurdia, a fighter for independence and declared unequivocally: "Georgia may leave the Soviet Union, but without South Ossetia and Abkhazia".

A similar situation happened on 8th August 2008, when the whole world was a witness to an obvious Russian aggression. This supported the fact that the South Ossetian problem was specially created for a Georgia fighting for independence, and if need be, Russia would be able to use Georgian-Ossetian conflict for its own imperial aims.

Today Georgia is striving towards membership of the democratic world. Georgia made its historical choice between democracy and imperialism. The choice of democracy and freedom faced Georgia once again before aggressive expansion of the Russian empire.

People's diplomacy during the Nagorno Karabagh conflict: Exchange and Resettlement (A case of Armenian and Azerbaidjanian settlements exchange²)

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The closing years of the Soviet Union as well as post-Soviet period were characterized, along with political, social, and economic crises, by multiple conflicts, an integral component of them being the phenomenon of “refugees.” Due to various ethno-political conflicts in the Caucasus (Georgian-Ossetian, Georgian-Abkhazian, Nagorno Karabagh), this phenomenon came to the fore with its utmost seriousness and array of attendant problems. Being a consequence of the conflicts, it plays a significant role in the context of political resolution of these very conflicts. In the meantime, this problem has brought about many issues in terms of new realities as well as the processes of social, psychological, and cultural adaptation that the confronting societies and the refugees themselves had to face.

The Nagorno-Karabakh conflict also was coupled with a huge wave of refugees. The clashes between Armenians and Azerbaijanis became more frequent in 1988; it was at that time that the first cases of mass deportation of Armenians from Azerbaijan and of Azerbaijanis from Armenia took place. Soon, the conflict entered into a phase of a large-scale violent warfare followed by the signing of a ceasefire agreement in 1994. Without denying the often tragic consequences of forced deportations, it is questioned here whether these processes were always necessarily so brutal. It is possible that there were also relatively peaceful processes of separation.

A case of the peaceful separation of Armenians and Azerbaijanians in the conflict period is presented. The peaceful way is determined by the processes of settlement exchanges.

There are settlements in both Armenia and Azerbaijan in which the populations came to agreements during the conflict and exchanged their settlements; for example, there is the case of the settlements exchange between Kerkendj (Azerbaijan) and Dzyunashog, formerly named Kzl Shafag, (Armenia).

The process of these settlements exchanges took place in 1988-1989. It has been a civic initiative in the conflict period.

What was the role of the state and what was the role of individual, even collective and civic, initiatives that contributed to the peaceful separation of these two ethnic communities? What were the social, cultural impacts of the settlements exchange?

The process of the settlements exchange (Kerkendj – Kzl Shafag) has the following components.

1. The “birth” of the idea of exchange.
2. The self-organization of community during the conflict.

² On the materials of Armenian-Azerbaijani scientific project supported by H. Boell Foundation.

3. The exchange process. Negotiations and the agreement of exchange.
4. The resettlement process. The transformation of individual and public spaces of the village after the resettlement.
5. The attitude toward the Muslims and Christian cemeteries after the exchange. The agreement to keep the cemeteries.

Arms transfers to Georgia before, during and after the South Ossetian conflict

Paul Holtom

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Even in an age of greater commercialisation of arms industries, arms transfers remain a particularly useful empirical source of information for monitoring and assessing relationships between particular states. For example, a state will normally only supply or permit the export of arms and military equipment to another state if relations between these two states are at least 'friendly'. At the same time, arms transfer relationships can also indicate the relative importance of relations between states; for example, in cases where pressure is put on the supplier not to supply a recipient state by a third state, the supplier's response can help indicate the relative weighting of relations with the recipient and third state.

After outlining the uses and limitations of arms transfer data for monitoring state-to-state relations, this paper will outline trends in arms transfers to Georgia since independence, highlighting who has supplied arms and military equipment and what has been supplied. The third part of the paper will focus attention upon the period since President Saakashvili took office in 2004, discussing arms suppliers, arms supplied and the rationale for Georgian arms acquisitions in this period – i.e. relating the equipment ordered and supplied to the Georgian national security and military strategies. This section will also discuss the alleged and actual transfers of arms to Georgia on the eve of and during the South Ossetian conflict. The paper will conclude by outlining the responses of Georgian suppliers to Russian calls for an arms embargo, and pressure to halt arms flows to Georgia, after the South Ossetian conflict.

«Enforcement of Georgia to Peace” or how important in politics to take into account peculiarities of collective memory**

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The Russian - Georgian- South Ossetian conflict which ignited at the beginning of August, 2008 has evoked stormy and ambiguous reactions all over the world. The greatest difference in interpretations of events was observed between the West and Russian public opinions. The diversity of opinions which were being expressed in the West, opinions that eventually came to support the Georgian side, were in marked

contrasted with the single-minded opinions shared by a unanimous Russian public. Many observers have explained Russian unanimity as the result of propaganda launched by a Russian media that is under State control. However, propaganda is most effective when it taps into the public's predispositions or when it can link a new idea to attitudes that the public already holds (Kinder & Sears, 1985). To reflect this, any thesis about Russian unanimity being the result of propaganda requires some additional examination. As I will be arguing in my presentation, certain properties of Russian consciousness make it especially vulnerable to uncritical perception of particular kinds of information that contain images of an enemy, sudden invasion, sufferings and heroic victory. These properties in turn take a root in Russian collective memory and identity, some peculiarities of which will be depicted in my presentation.

According to the sociocultural approach employed in my presentation, different kinds of narrative are considered as cultural tools, promoting collective remembering while special properties of narratives shape this process. One such property is the "schematic narrative template", which differs from one cultural setting to another, and which is employed as a basic model for constructing "plot lines" for important historical events (Wertsch, 2002). The author distinguishes the specifically Russian schematic narrative template, which he describes as "*triumph over alien (external) forces*." This narrative template consists of the following components: 1. The original situation ... "the Russian people are living peacefully without threatening others" is cut short: 2. by difficulties or aggression of an external force or an agent that leads to: 3. a crisis and suffering, which: 4. are overcome by the triumph of the Russian people fighting heroically on their own".

Developing this line of research, my study of collective memory in Russia and the Caucasus (Garagozov, 2002, 2005, 2006) reveals that some cultures have developed schematic narrative templates which through historical socialization shape their «patterns» of collective memory. *Patterns* are considered as groups' structured and persistent perceptions of themselves and their past, their interpretation of their own motives and the motives of others. The model of collective memory outlined here thus makes the general prediction. Patterns of collective memory can be instrumentalized by political elites through the politics of memory. This involves activating narratives (with certain schematic narrative templates) through official historiography, history textbooks, mass media coverage, and political leaders' speeches. I will test these assumptions through the analysis of speeches of Russian political leaders on the issue of Russian –Georgian military conflict. This would allow both scholars and the policy-making community to take into account specific factors of collective memory, and incorporate these insights into more effective conflict resolution processes.

“De facto states” or “de facto annexed”? How to deal with Georgian breakaway provinces of Abkhazia and South Ossetia

Thornike Gordadze

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This paper will make an attempt to analyse the political economy of Georgia's breakaway regions. There are two opposite views in scholarly literature on the subject, considering these territories either as fully independent and sovereign or as merely annexed by the Russian Federation. Based on our fieldwork conducted in different breakaway zones we can suggest a different understanding of the question.

By adopting the methodology of historical sociology of politics and by analysing power and elite structures under the soviet period, one can conclude that the secessionist movements since the beginning of Perestroika were particularly important and successful in those regions, where the status of an autonomous republic or 'oblast' was already available. Ethnic tensions were numerous (between Armenians and Georgians, Azeris and Georgians), but only in former soviet autonomies did they lead to secession and armed conflicts. Even if at the moment of the foundation of the Soviet State the rationality of granting some regions and ethnicities with peculiar statuses was mainly instrumental and sometimes even artificial, the “form” progressively reinforced the “content”. Decades of existence of indigenous political and party institutions has not only produced a strong identity and emotional ties of peoples to their territorial unit, but has also made up generations of relatively numerous bureaucracy, party and “cultural” elites.

These elites had already developed their own networks and links with the central soviet authorities, and Tbilisi's tutorship in many cases was only nominal, especially in post-Stalin Abkhazia. The same local elites were strongly standing for their autonomous statuses and opposed the dissolution of the Soviet Union – guarantor of their status -- and disregarded Georgian independence. They were well connected enough and had sufficient resources (police, local soviets, universities, public transportation) to organise resistance and to challenge Tbilisi.

The paper will also try to analyse how the breakaway regions have existed in the period between the secession and their official recognition by the Russian Federation in August 2008. What were their resources while all external economic transactions were virtually illegal? It will focus on how they managed to deal with other states, international organisations and non state international actors. And finally, it will put under scrutiny the nature of their relationship with Russia – their almost official patron. The paper will also try to show how the degree of independence of these formations has varied from the 1990s to the present day and how the Russian Federation itself has managed to bypass international and sometimes its own laws in order to develop its relationship with the above mentioned regions.

Which are the implications of Russia's recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia as independent States for international conflict resolution in Georgia?

Märta-Lisa Magnusson

Dept. of International Migration and Ethnic Relations, Malmö University

How will Russia's recognition affect internationally sponsored efforts to obtain political settlements of the conflicts between, on the one side, the central authorities in Tbilisi and, on the other, the two breakaway regions Abkhazia and South Ossetia?

Is it still possible to settle these conflicts within the established intra-state –conflict paradigm?

If not, what does that mean for the international society which until now have refrained from – and most likely will continue to refrain from - recognizing Abkhazia and South Ossetia as independent states.

Which are the implications as regards the humanitarian aspects of the conflicts? How are international efforts to deal with the problems of earlier as well as newly created generations of IDP's and refugees affected by Russia's recognition of Abkhazia/South Ossetia?

“Post” Conflict Displacement: Isolation and Integration in Georgia: the case of IDPs from the Abkhaz Conflicts

Olga Mayorova, Beth Mitchneck and Joanna Regulska

Department of Sociology and Department of Geography and Regional Development, Arizona University; Department of Women's and Gender Studies, Rutgers University

The Abkhaz civil wars and continuing territorial conflicts have resulted in the long-term displacement of over 200,000 people since the early 1990s. While the international and local discourses are about integrating internally displaced people (IDPs), little research has documented the meaning of isolation or integration for the daily lives of the IDPs or the general population. Using a conceptual framework that centers both the migrant and the social network in the governance environment of conflict situations, we explore two key issues: a comparison of the composition of social networks and the nature of social interactions between the general population and IDPs, and a comparison of IDPs living in different forms of dwelling (collective centers or private housing). We combine the formal social network analysis with a daily path analysis to explore how daily spatial patterns may be formative of social networks. The social network analysis indicates isolation among the entire population with generally small and highly connected (or closed) social networks that exclude almost all but family. In other words, characteristics of social networks are very similar across populations and gender and are hardly distinguished in terms of size, density, and other characteristics. The vast majority of IDPs interact nearly exclusively with other IDPs that they knew over 15 years ago, prior to displacement. In addition, the

daily paths of all IDPs and general population are highly constrained with low spatial mobility evidenced. As expected, some IDPs in private housing have more integrated social networks than those living in collective centers, but those are generally IDPs who engage in income generating activity. In fact, the one demographic factor that we have found to distinguish social networks is engaging in income generating activity. Using narrative interviews from 180 respondents gathered in Zugdidi, Kutaisi, and Tbilisi in summer 2007, we also explore the ways that both the general population and IDPs frame their reliance on and usage of social networks. A key finding from the study is that from a policy perspective, simply closing collective centers and dispersing the population to live among the general population is not likely to result in any form of integration besides a geographical spacing of IDPs among the general population. Given that the number and situation of IDPs in Georgia has changed since August 2008, it is important to understand the daily practices of the longer term IDPs to help us improve the human security of all of the people living in displacement.

Possible Variants for the European Union Involvement in the Settlement of the “Frozen” Conflicts in the Caucasian States.

Hanna Shelest

Odessa National University

National Institute for Strategic Studies (Ukraine)

The author will analyze the role of the European Union as a new active actor in the Black Sea Region as a whole as of its separate members, which influence the general perception of the EU position towards the final peace settlement of the “frozen conflicts” in the Caucasian states (Nagorniy Kharabah, South Ossetia and Abkhazia). This topic is up to date in the frame of the latest events taking place in the region, especially the Russian-Georgian crisis and the active role of the European Union towards its mediation.

The first attempt by the European Union to be involved in the Black Sea “frozen” conflicts was made in the Transnistria conflict in 2005 as a result of the Ukrainian Peace Plan. For a long time the European Union hasn’t been involved in the Caucasian conflicts settlement, but has been interested in the transport and energy projects there, so keen to see this region peaceful and stable. Also the Caucasian states see European Union as a “fair broker” by comparison to the USA, Russia or Turkey, and more influential than the UN or OSCE which for years could not suggest a solution for conflict resolution.

After the Georgian-Russian crisis of August 2008 we can start to speak about the European Union as an active actor in the region, and ready to be involved in the mediation process as well as conflict settlement. Attempts by such states as France and Germany, as well as partners of Georgia – Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia and Poland -- demonstrated a readiness to take a responsibility for the region, while not yet setting the format of such involvement and diffusion of ideas, which are not formulated in the position of the European Union as a whole.

In the article the author will emphasize the problems which come from the situation of the unsettlement of these conflicts and influence the whole region and the European Union itself. Caucasian states would like to integrate into the European community and to cooperate with its main institutions for solving crucial problems. The author will analyse the ability of the European Union and its member-states to be a sole mediator and possibilities for cooperation with other third parties.

The rapidly increasing military expenditure in the South Caucasus**

Petter Stålenheim

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Military expenditure in the South Caucasus has increased, in real terms, by more than 500 per cent over the ten-year period 1998-2007 and 285 per cent over the five years 2003-2007. Some commentators have suggested that these rates of growth could be seen as evidence of an arms race in the region. Classical arms race theory defines an arms race as a competitive acquisition of weaponry. This paper seeks to address the central question: is there a case for defining the rapidly increasing military spending in the South Caucasus as an arms race or are there driving factors other than inter regional competition that better explain the extreme trends in military spending in the region?

The three countries in the region, Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia, have all to a different degree participated in this drive for increased military capabilities. Geographically, this mountainous region is squeezed between the Black Sea in the West, the Caspian Sea in the East, the unstable Russian North Caucasian republics, Chechnya, Dagestan, Ingushetia and North Ossetia in the North and Iran and Turkey in the South, placing it in a central crossroads where nationalities, religions and great power ambitions meet. Being a region with vast but unevenly distributed natural resources and a history of ethnic conflict and forced migration, it is not strange that it contains several more or less dormant conflicts. Consequently, the security situation in the region is fragile and these states see several reasons for increasing their military spending.

This proposed paper describes and analyzes the exceptional rates of increase in military expenditure in the South Caucasus during the past five years. In so doing it addresses the question posed above on whether the rapid increasing military spending in the South Caucasus is to be seen as a classic case of an arms race. The first section briefly describes the debate around the arms race concept, followed by a short description of the conflicts in the region, focusing on the aspects that have a bearing on the developments in military expenditure. It then continues with a more in-depth description of the military expenditure trends, first in Armenia and Azerbaijan and thereafter in Georgia. Finally, the paper concludes with a discussion on possible future trends in South Caucasian military expenditure.

IDPs and forced migration as a factor in conflict transformation: Abkhazia, Georgia

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The conflict in Abkhazia is one of the saddest legacies of the Soviet nationality policy. Post-totalitarian governments have appeared incapable or unwilling to formulate and maintain strategies facilitating co-existence and co-operation. Rather, political elites have exploited the attractiveness of nationalist or secessionist slogans for building political careers. In the current situation of elevated tensions and the military build-up in the region it is essential but almost impossible to build partnerships between opposing parties, formulate flexible strategies and form consensus around co-operation priorities. Most populist discourse on all sides is exploiting ethnic and political myths about the legitimate rights of one or another group violated by opponents, accusing the other of aggressive intentions and double standards. A conflict with an explicit winner and loser, it was followed by a reshuffling of the ethno-demographic structure of the population, creating hundreds of thousands of displaced people. Such a conflict is especially difficult to cope with, as the winner would by no means give up its gains (mainly in the sense of demographic balance or de facto status) and return to the status quo ante belli. Deeply suspicious of one another, sides in conflict still live in an illusion that time may be working for them, while experiencing major economic, demographic and political losses, and the strengthening of authoritarianism, insecurity and political volatility. External players have added a significant portion of unpredictability to the existing volatility, particularly since the beginning of 2008. Various dimensions and scenarios for the Abkhazian-Georgian conflict are discussed, particularly from the perspective of the issues of demographic balance, migration, repatriation and/or integration of the displaced populations.

Section 2: The Caucasus and global politics

Northern Caucasia in the All-Caucasian, Russian and European contacts' system

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From the beginning of the 1990s the Caucasian region has been the focus of political, economic and ideological diplomacy among the various states. Analyzing a modern situation and prospects of possible events' deployment besides a world policy around of it however it's necessary to consider internal – All-Caucasian – conditions (including some historical aspects).

In the 1980s and 90s there was a return to ideas, non-realized in 1917-1920 of the Mountain Republic and the Caucasian Federation / Confederation. At that time Caucasian-centrist tendencies were showed in the formation and activity of the Assembly of Mountain People of the Caucasus (next the Confederation of Mountain People of the Caucasus, and later the Confederation of Mountain People) and the International Forum the Caucasian House. Heads of the Confederation have proclaimed a restoration of a sovereign statehood of Northern Caucasus as one of their purposes. However they did not possess the means of the control over events' succession and have appeared neither able to prevent beginnings of conflicts – Ossetian-Ingush, South-Ossetian – Georgian, Abkhazian-Georgian and Russian-Chechen – nor to achieve an armistice. As to the realization of the Caucasian idea – its backbone-center could be Georgia, but during several years it was object not only of ideological and political “attacks”, as well as military “operations” from Russia. Now the All-Caucasian idea has ceased to be an “ideal” to which would aspire the Caucasian people. Nevertheless, world tendencies to regionalization and democratization remain of current importance, so a change of political elites' orientation of Northern and South Caucasia are not excluded. (It is notable that on 13 August 2008 the President of Turkey, Abdullah Gul, initiated the creation of “A Forum of stability of the Caucasus” / “Caucasian Alliance”).

In view of the incursion by the Russian army into the territory of Georgia, and a recognition of Russia's claim for the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, the “Caucasian” policy has become a priority matter of external activity for Europe. The certain potential for strengthening the European influence on the Northern Caucasus is apparent, in ideological (“the western values”), and economic range, and - in the case of the deployment of international peace-making forces in disputed zones in the territory of Georgia – within the military sphere.

“Central Asia and the Caucasus: History, Realities, Perspectives”**

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Historically, Central Asia and the Caucasus have formed a strategic location on the Silk Road, along which people and goods have moved between Europe and Asia for thousands of years. The importance of this region, which borders such vast countries as Russia and China, as well as Afghanistan, Iran, and Turkey, has not changed. With the development of petroleum and gas resources along the Caspian Sea, the region is attracting attention as a new supplier of energy resources.

Some 17 years have now passed since the region achieved independence with the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991. Since then, some countries have enjoyed steady economic development because of rich natural resources, and some have made significant progress in their transition to a market economy. Others, meanwhile, maintain closed political and economic systems or have experienced civil war. The speed and direction of development within the region therefore varies greatly.

However, due to strong control from the central government and a clear division of industries remaining from the Soviet era, many of these countries do not possess developed socioeconomic systems and still face common challenges, such as establishing democratic systems and transferring to market economies. Another common issue is the development of human resources capable of realizing these reforms. Moreover, people living in rural areas face poverty and unemployment as a result of the economic crises that accompanied independence.

Many issues facing the Central Asian and Caucasus states will necessitate inter-state cooperation for any progress to be made, including natural resource development, water protection, conservation and management, trade and transit, and combating disease and drug-trafficking. These and many other issues can simply not be solved on a national basis, no matter how committed an individual government may ultimately become to reform and overall economic development. Particularly in land-locked Central Asia, states are dependent on the willingness and ability of their immediate neighbors to take action on critical issues that affect them all.

In spite of the evident need for sub-regional cooperation in both Central Asia and the Caucasus, little progress has been made over a decade. In fact, in areas such as the Ferghana Valley in Central Asia—which was formerly integrated economically, but has now been divided among Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan—regional cooperation has deteriorated steadily, with a devastating impact on population livelihoods. Efforts to tackle regional issues such as drug trafficking have also been stymied. And, in both Central Asia and the Caucasus, tariff and quantitative controls, and new border regimes have closed crossing points and disrupted trade and transit for goods and people.

As a whole, features of the legal system and a mode of government comprise the major factors of political development the countries of Central Asia and the Caucasus at the present stage.

In the conclusion, I would like to note that the conference "Caucasus Studies in Migration, Society, Language", with discussions among scholars and researchers from different countries of world, will undoubtedly a new appraisal of the past, present and future of one of the most restless parts of our planet and it will serve as the beginning of new international research projects. The dialogue of civilizations, so necessary now, should proceed. Scholars can bring a considerable contribution to overcoming of modern international contradictions, to the substantiation of ways and methods of modernizing the countries of Central Asia and the Caucasus.

Besides, the received information within the framework of this conference is planned for use in the educational process. It allows an expanded knowledge among students and professors in concepts and theories. In addition, it would be to expand a circle of sources, to be acquainted with the various scientific schools engaged in studying the problems and perspectives relations of regions: Eurasia, Central Asia and Caucasus regions.

The Uniqueness of the Caucasian Conflicts?

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The Caucasus is very similar in ethnic terms to the Iranian region of Fereydan, to which a substantial number of Caucasians (Georgians and Armenians) were displaced in the 17th century. On the other hand, it shares the same political legacy as Central Asia, but it is very different in ethnic terms. By comparison of the Caucasus with other regions, it is tried to find out why there are so many cases of conflict in the Caucasus and which combination of social, economic, political, geographical, and demographic factors determine/ contributes to this.

Russo-Georgian war – a new era in world politics

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The Russo-Georgian war revealed new challenges to the world. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Kosovo was the first new state recognized by the world. It gave hopes to other unrecognized governments that they could also become valued members of the international community. On August 25, Medvedev recognized 2 more "republics", those of South Ossetia and Abkhazia.

An overview of the history shows that creation of new states mostly takes place after wars. The most recent "round" was after the Cold War, when the Soviet Union was divided into 15 independent states. The previous one happened after WW II.

Emerging new states meant agreement among the countries, normalization of their relations, and a set of new borders. But now it's start of the new confrontation, clash of interests and new attempt to re-distribute spheres the influence .

We are facing new politics in the 21st century. The Russo- Georgian war revealed several new challenges to the international society. On one hand, a clash of interest of the big powers, Russia and USA. On the other hand – Georgia's striving to build a democratic and secured state.

This war renewed discussions about several topics:

1. Question of national identity. One can prove that during last 15 years South Ossetian Identity has formed and they deserve their own state. But there may be counter-arguments. So, before we discuss this issue, we should know what is national identity and what are its rights, where is the border between separatism and state recognition? Who has authority to decide it?
2. Geopolitical balance of power. Some political analysts claim that the Russo-Georgian war did not change the power balance, but others argue that it means a return of a big power on the international scene – Russia -- in order to defend its own national interests.
3. The Russo-Georgian war was a clear proof of the fact that the real reason for inter-ethnic conflicts is weakening the governments of certain countries. They are political instruments of successful rule and the preservation of influence sphere for the Russian Federation in the region.

This war also raised a couple of important questions: what is destiny of the small states in the modern world? – To be a buffer, or to have an independent role? Are they really really free to make a choice and are there security guarantees for them? How can they deal with double standards?

Creation of the new state is not an easy process and does not depend only on the wish of the certain ethnic or social group. Such an important decision is made on the agreement on many states, not by the single one. International law acknowledges territorial integrity and sovereignty of the states. So, it's very interesting to find out which internal and external factors trigger new states, what are their ways to independence and how they start new a history, where this conflict leads us.

The factor of the Caucasus in Global Politics

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Various superpowers have often showed their interest in the Caucasus. The interests of Russia in the Caucasus originated in the 18th century and continued until the beginning of the 20th century. These interests resulted from geopolitical factors. However, following the last decade of the 20th century, a confluence of geopolitical and economic interests occurred. Geopolitical interests are the most important factors that define world politics.

After the tension between the West and East had decreased considerably and after decomposition of the USSR had taken place, the Caucasus and essentially the South Caucasus, still turned out to be in the center of attention of world superstates, still occurred in the crossing of interests. However, the events after 2001 made us think, that this contradiction between the West and East was entering into a new phase. The involvement of a new participant in this contradiction is easily seen.

Among the geopolitical centers, Bzhezinsky mentions the Ukraine, Azerbaijan, South Korea, Turkey and Iran. The question is, if Turkey and Azerbaijan are geopolitical centers, why would Georgia not be such a center? There are two main circumstances to make us assume that Georgia is a geopolitical center.

1. Georgia is located between Turkey and Azerbaijan and is geographically connecting these two states and 2. Georgia is an energetic bridge between these two states.

It is considered, that Georgia should be mentioned among the geopolitical centers as well. Zbignev Bzhezinsky's position may be explained by the fact that at the period when „The Great Chess board” was published (1996), the energetic projects which passed Georgia were not completed yet. In this way attention was not especially paid to Georgia in order to avoid the greater suppression on it from Russia. The main axis in the Caucasus is the „South Caucasian bridge”.

Political instability is one of the factors which can be used by one state towards the other state, in order to make the allies lose the interests. In fact, if the geopolitical potential is not used rationally by a geopolitical center, a devaluation and possible loss of geopolitical functions may be expected for a long time.

Just such kind of actions were undertaken by Russia towards Georgia. The separatist regions (Abkhazia and Tskhinvali) are the mechanisms, which are actively used by Russia for the purpose of achieving control over Georgia and completely over the Caucasus region. By losing the control over Abkhazia, Russia would also lose an important area for controlling the Black Sea.

Tensions in the political processes in Georgia and the whole Caucasus may lead to a political as well as economic crisis in the world, as the superstates are involved in the events. Political events are developing with great speed. The contours of multipolice world are being revealed more and more clearly. A condition of vital importance for a stable development in global world is the coordination of actions and working out of common standards.

Mirza Kuchek Khan'ın Movement in Iranian Azerbaijan and its reflection in the Turkish Newspaper "Varl'ık"

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The revolutionary and turbulent situation in Iran during the period 1917-1921 invited the Bolshevik Government "to press home its advantage" in Iran. The principal Bolshevik strategy in the Middle East appeared from the outset to take a dual form -- as a struggle for promoting the revolutionary cause in forms "adapted" to the socio-economic conditions in the Middle East and as a struggle against the British presence. In Iran, as elsewhere in Asia, the national and international interests of Soviet Russia shaded into each other, and the distinction between them proved difficult to disentangle. With the ideological consideration of establishing "socialism" in Iran, the Bolsheviks also believed that their major efforts should be channeled in the direction of weakening and finally ousting British power. In this study Mirza Kuche Han's movement, with its known revolutionary aspects during the period after the First World War, and the British-Russian struggle and its reflection in the Turkish Newspaper "Varl'ık" are presented. The Turkish Government and especially the East Front Commandership of Turkey had an interest in developments that had effected the region.

Section 3: Diaspora studies

Making Abkhaz, Chechen, Adyge out of the Cherkess (Çerkez): Transformation of Ethnic Identity in the North Caucasian Diaspora in Turkey in the Post-1989 Period

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Since the early days in the late 19th Century of their forced settlement in Anatolia, disparate North Caucasian communities residing in Turkey were considered by the dominant Turkish society as one community of various subgroups under the umbrella identity of “Cherkess/Çerkez”, which incidentally was the ethnic designation in the Turkish, Russian and Arabic languages for the largest community of all the North Caucasian Diaspora, the Circassians (Adyge). Despite not being able to use the term in any legal context, due to legal suppression of all ethnic identities in Turkey until the last two decades, the elites of these various groups have socialized and organized their communities together by internalizing this identity. Therefore the term “Cherkess/Cerkez” came to represent the whole North Caucasian community in modern Turkey in daily use, while the term “North Caucasian” was used in all legal contexts for over a century until the collapse of the Soviet Union in the 1990s.

Nonetheless, as a result of the re-establishment of communication with their homeland communities as well as of the successive wars in South Ossetia, Abkhazia and Chechnya after the collapse of the Soviet Union, all subgroups but the Circassians (Adyge) have begun to drift away from the term identity as well as the North Caucasian community associations and established their own organisations with their respective self designations, the terminology of which is mostly borrowed from the homeland, in the official name.

Within a few years only the Circassians (Adyge) and a handful of Abkhazians remained as members and frequenters of the more than seventy North Caucasian community centres throughout Turkey, as the Abkhaz, Chechen, Ossetians and the Daghestani all had their own societies. Despite the fact that at one time this entire trend seemed somewhat irreversible, the Cherkessness/Çerkezness both as an umbrella identity and in terminological use is currently in the process of being reintroduced, albeit this time covering only the Circassians(Adyge) and Abkhaz, and the Ossetians in some instances, but certainly not the Chechen, Daghestani or Karachay-Balkar identities.

In my presentation I would like to analyze the transformation that Cherkessness/Çerkezness has been going through from both the terminological and the communal identity perspective, and will try to shed light on the dynamics of this process.

A symbolic return? The Armenian Diaspora on the way to Armenia

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Looking at the recent impact of US American Armenians on the local society in Armenia, this paper will focus on the interplay between a nostalgic project of homecomings and pragmatic development programmes. In this case we deal with members of established and “rich” Western diasporic members who move to Armenia for temporal visits, keeping their strong ties to the US adopted homeland. By transferring economic and social capital into a poor land, the US American Armenians get a feeling to be incorporated into the sacred land in different ways. One example of such transnational incorporation into the Armenian society is related to a successful environmental project on reforestation of the Armenian landscape. Another is related to “resettling” practices of young Armenians from the US and Canada. In this process a specific form of relationship has been established between diasporic members and local actors – donor-recipient relations which are based less on cultural intimacy and ethnic ties but rather on the pragmatism of “western aid” and new power constellations. The motivating force in the decision to move is not only imagined patriotism but also economic and pragmatic interests relying on global and cosmopolitan ideas of “progress”, “development” and on the idea of reconnecting lost homeland to the rest of the world. The question is to what extent we can talk about Armenian repatriation today and how do returnees reshape the public space in a new land?

The Armenian Diaspora and the Possibility of Reconciliation between Armenia and Turkey

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The Armenian Genocide plays an important role in international politics through the urge of the Diaspora to force modern Turkey to recognize the Armenian genocide. Films like Atom Egoyan's »Ararat« are tokens of the unhealed mental wounds of the genocide. However, the Armenian Apostolic Church and lately even the Armenian president are apparently seeking reconciliation with Turkey, as shown at the occasion of the visit of Turkish president Gül to Yerevan. The prospect of a common future within the EU may be the reason for this particular trend in the Armenian homeland.

Alternative Caucasian spaces

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Having investigated the Caucasian space itself, we will look at alternative spaces for Caucasian identity formation. The project is part of a broader project on Alternative Spaces. Seen in our perspective the project "Alternative Caucasian spaces" seeks to investigate how people under pressure manage to set their own agenda by creating alternative spaces defined by themselves and to interact with the world outside. We will investigate two groups: Chechens, as the largest ethno-national group in the Caucasus and minor groups in diaspora, and Circassians, the largest Caucasian group in diaspora and minor groups in Russia. Both groups are characterised by recent trans-national mobilisations and global cooperation through their diasporas and through the internet. We will look at their potential for resistance, their defence of contested versions of history and the formation of counter identities in areas of international recognition through international organisations and the existing diaspora networks.

The Ordeal of the Persecuted Armenians during World War I – the witness of Maria Jacobsen**

Britta June Johnsen
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Maria Jacobsen was a Danish nurse who by accident happened to be present in Eastern Anatolia during World War I, thus becoming an eye witness of the genocide, and who was involved in sheltering and saving Armenians. Her diary constitutes invaluable source material for the plight of the Western Armenians. Thus a Danish group of scholars is working on a scholarly edition of this huge and important work, intended for publication on the Internet as open source material.

Abkhazian diasporas in the World

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Abkhazians live in Georgia, in the Autonomous Republic of Abkhazia. Abkhazians speaking in the Abkhazian language also live in Turkey, Syria, and are scattered in the post-soviet countries.

The major reason of resettlement of Abkhazians in the various countries is Muhajiroba. *Muhajir* is an Arabian word meaning "resettled person, emigrant".

Muhajiroba commenced in Abkhazia in the first half of the nineteenth century, as a

result of political defeat and cruel suppression of a people's rebellion by the Abkhazian feudal lords of pro-Turkish orientation. Muhajiroba is a historical phenomenon, which was tragically reflected in the fate of numerous Northern Caucasian peoples. The provocation of this phenomenon and accompanying historical processes were completely based upon Czarist politics of Russia.

Russia desired to have the Caucasus without the Caucasians and made efforts to fulfill this desire. Unfortunately, up to the present, Russian politics in this respect have not changed. Russia is driven by the same desire as two centuries ago.

Under the guise of peacemaker Russia gradually takes over Caucasian territory. Currently, the largest Diaspora of Abkhazians, resettled at a time of Muhajiroba, is in Turkey. In Turkey, the number of Abkhazians is about 100 thousand and in the Arabian countries about 15 000. A small part of the Abkhazians live in Northern Greece as well. Basically they live in the villages and they have maintained their language and traditions.

Contemporary Armenian Community in Tbilisi

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The proposed paper is to present a comprehensive picture of one of the specific Armenian Diaspora formations, namely the Armenian community of Tbilisi (hereinafter is referred as the Community), one of the oldest among Armenian communities worldwide. This community is of great importance in terms of its potential role (and mission) in bridging two Caucasian neighboring state capitals – Tbilisi and Yerevan. From a historical point of view, the Community is also unique. In particular, having been one of the most prosperous and significant communities and actually the Armenian cultural center during the end of the 19th and beginning of the 20th century, it faces many problems and actually is a community in need of assistance from Homeland-Armenia, which is not a common phenomenon for Armenian communities worldwide.

The paper is based on an extensive ethnographic fieldwork carried out in Tbilisi since 2006 and complementary secondary data analyses, namely, audio-video materials, reports, articles and books published on the theme as well as different internet sources. Fieldwork included observations in various community institutions including churches, families, different commemorations, celebrations and rituals, events of community significance, etc., in-depth interviews among Tbilisi Armenians different social and age groups and expert-interviews with scholars, community leaders, and public figures.

The paper³ aims to explore separately the following main aspects of the Tbilisi Armenian community life, fusing them into one holistic structure:

³ Some part of the paper has primarily been introduced at the Graduate Student Colloquium in Armenian Studies, University of California Los Angeles (UCLA), USA in February 15, 2008. Discussions and feedback I got there has been very useful in terms of complimenting and enhancing the paper.

1. The brief history of the Community formation and its current social-demographic situation with the inclusion of key statistics about the community,
2. Community structures and agents.

Thereafter, the paper attempts to answer the following questions:

1. What are the problems and challenges the Community faces today (integration into the Georgian community and state structures, issues of minority rights and obligations, ethnic culture preservation and so on)?
2. What are the important contemporary trends, likely developments over the next few years and main reaction patterns to the current realities in the country (Georgia)?
3. What is the level of the Community-Homeland relationships, more specifically, between the community structures and Armenian society and state structures?
4. What main identity components can be defined among Tbilisi-Armenians (self-identification, attitudes/feelings, specific behavior patterns, and symbols)?

Whilst trying to fuse the description of the community and its main characteristics into one holistic structure, the paper is still however a “view from inside” with a further need of the search for the Georgian language sources and Georgian (both state and society) points of view presented. Consequently that might be a topic for another paper.

Armenian Diaspora: Rendezvous between Past and Present

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During the course of its history Armenia has been the source of emigrational streams, and also a country accepting repatriate Armenians from all over the world (especially the USA, Europe and Near East). Today the Armenian Diaspora is more or less representative in Russia (more than 2.5 million people), in the USA (more than 1.5 million), and in France (500,000). Presently about 3.5 million people live in the territory of Armenia.

In different historical periods the formation of the Armenian Diaspora took place with various degrees of intensiveness. The geographic and cultural puzzle of the settlement of Armenians in the world is absolutely broad and oddly diverse. For example, Armenian settlements in Jerusalem are ascribed to the 4th century. Valid data about Armenians in Italy, where they held positions as local emperors (555-565, Nerses, Patrick, Isaac, Haykazun), are credited to the 6th-7th centuries. Subsequently, in Ravenna they formed a residence which was actually called Armenia.

Already in the middle of the 16th century the Armenian population in Venice widened so much that there was need for legal regulation in the life of the community. Then the Constitution of Armenians in Italy was adopted and has remained in function ever since.

Besides the specifics of each country today, the Diaspora undergoes structural changes: it broadens basically on account of labor migration. If towards the beginning of the 20th

century the migration of Armenians from Western Armenia was conditioned by the Genocide of Armenians by Turks in 1915, then at the beginning of the 21st century a new impulse of migration of Armenians came forward with the collapse of the USSR. Socio-political and economic instability in the country justified the migration of a great quantity of specialists with higher education. Having a higher level of education, representatives of Armenian communities in Russia and in the countries of the EU differ as a rule from migrants on the whole. This fact, as well as the high status that comes with being socially active, defines the structure of their employment and therefore the level integration to the new society.

The North Caucasian and Abkhaz Diasporas in Turkey

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The disintegration of the Soviet Socialist Republics was well organized but the breaking up of the union happened suddenly and left huge problems behind. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the South Caucasian republics within the union have declared their independence and been recognized by the world community (eg. Georgia 8th April 1991, Azerbaijan 30th August 1991 and Armenia 21st September 1991). Some of the autonomous republics within these republics have also declared their independence and wars have taken place (like Georgia-South Ossetia; Georgia-Abkhazia) but they are not recognized by the world community and they stayed as “de facto” independent states until 26th August 2008 when the president of the Russian Federation recognized the Republics of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Today these two newly recognized states and the North Caucasus republics, except Kabardino-Balkaria, within the Russian Federation are having demographic problems in their ethnic identity because they have a major diaspora outside their homeland.

One of the crowded North Caucasian and Abkhaz diaspora, of several million people, lives in Turkey as an inheritance of the Ottoman Empire. In Turkey, the word "Cherkess", Russian for Circassian, is used to designate any North-Caucasian. They often use the word Circassian/Cherkess for all Northwest Caucasians and are conscious that they all share a common heritage. Meanwhile the Circassians usually call themselves Adyghe. The wars in the Caucasus (Abkhazia, Chechenya, South Ossetia) have strongly enhanced national feelings among diaspora. During these wars meetings were held, solidarity committees were founded, money was collected, and volunteers joined armed militias. The collapse of the Soviet Union also generated possibilities for the Circassian diaspora to visit their motherlands. This also raised their strong ethnical identities.

The North Caucasians living in Turkey have preserved their languages (especially in the villages) and dances. The general customs of the Abkhazians (Apsuvara) and the Circassians (Khabze) are strictly kept, especially by those living in the villages or those living in cities having connections with their organizations.

Meanwhile the Circassian and Abkhaz diaspora live in an experienced NATO member country, Turkey, in which the government is helping the new NATO nominee country,

Georgia, in terms of commercial and military means. The Circassian and Abkhaz diaspora members who are not happy with their government's military support for Georgia, support which may have been used against their relatives during the wars (Georgian-Abkhazian (1992-1993); Georgian-South Ossetian (1991-1992 and 2008)), are arranging activities to influence their government's decisions.

In this paper the resettlement of the Circassians and Abkhazians in the Ottoman land, the composition of the Circassian and Abkhaz organizations in Turkey, connections with other organizations in the world, plus motherlands and the lobbying activities of the Circassian and Abkhazian diaspora organizations will be explained.

South Caucasus: From Migrants to Diaspora**

Armine Yukhanyan

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The global perspective on migration indicates that populations move throughout the world in times of peace and in times of upheaval. Although some persons are forced to leave and adjust to host countries, adapt and acculturate, others migrate in order to better their existence and to avail themselves of economic opportunities and achieve personal growth.

Nowadays, migration remains a key topic in public and political debates across the region of South Caucasus. The South Caucasus, comprising the states of Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia, is internationally known for its conflicts after the break-up of the Soviet Union of which it formed a part. Such conflicts gave birth and/or rebirth to Georgian, Azerbaijani and other Diasporas of peoples of the former USSR. During the years of transition these countries were accompanied with huge voluntary population movements, which changed the composition of their former population. The effects of these population movements vary depending on each country's context, its economic and social trends, the scale and characteristics of its migration flows, and the behavior of individual migrants.

Given the variety of both causes and consequences of migration in general, the paper will present common patterns of migration of South Caucasian countries, and particularly will focus on effects of migration in terms of Diaspora formation. Diasporas often reproduce contradictory situations within their titular states. Some of the Diasporas become the base for consolidation of forces for preserving their national culture, while others participate in opposition to the governments of their homelands. However, specific attention will be paid to social formations, institutions developed within the Diaspora community and their further positive influences. With this regard, formation and current state of the Armenian Diaspora will be taken as a case study. In addition, effects of two types of Diasporas (old and new) will be taken into account, which are very different in terms of the background and mentality.

Therefore, while presenting general causes and consequences of migration, the paper will make a strong argument in favor of migration in terms of Diaspora formation and through its institutions and agents its further influence on the home country's economic,

social and political life. It is supposed, that the paper will provide grounds for finding the fact of migration positive, and looking for ways to assist in formation of Diaspora institutions on one hand, and improve the cooperation with the existing ones, on the other hand. For example, the Armenian Diaspora is assigned a pivotal role as ‘first movers’ in spearheading the process and taking up the initiative of investing in the risky business environment raising the country’s competitiveness and attractiveness of the larger capital.

Finally, international experience demonstrates that managed migration and Diaspora formation has numerous advantages. In the Armenian context, government actions towards regulation of issues of Armenians being overseas can only become successful if they are carried out in cooperation with the Armenian Diaspora. Thus, a lot depends on the migration programs implemented by the governments as well as Diaspora involvement in the migration process.

Section 4:

Identities in transition. Migration and identity

Labels versus groups: negotiating group identity in Kabardino-Balkaria

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Until quite recently the autonomous republic of Kabardino-Balkaria in the Northwestern Caucasus was generally regarded as a peaceful and relatively stable place in Russia's volatile underbelly, especially when compared to war-torn Chechnya and its violence-infected neighbours Dagestan and Ingushetia. However, since the attack on its capital Nalchik by 150 armed assailants in October 2005, the republic is sometimes considered as a new front in the enduring conflict between Moscow and the underground networks of Islamist resurgents. Although not as violent as its eastern neighbours, Kabardino-Balkaria has become emblematic for the complex challenges Russia is facing in the North Caucasus, a region coping with at least two, often intermingling, currents with a separatist reflex: ethnonationalism and radical Islamism.

This paper explores ethnonationalist and religious activism from an identity perspective. Collective identification will be approached from two analytically distinctive angles: as externally constituted categories and as internally defined groups. The collective categories for ethnic and religious groups which are used today to denominate the indigenous population were not used or known in the North Caucasus when Tsarist Russia made its first incursions into the region. In many cases they were produced by the imperial system in a process of administrative delimitation. The Soviet nationalities policies reworked this into a new system of social classification by creating sub-state ethno-cultural nationalities (*natsional'nost*), which were often attached to a territorial concept of nationhood.

This study examines how, starting with the ethnonational and Islamic revivals during perestroika, these imposed categories have been continuously challenged by internally defined and evolving group identities, leading to conflicting expectations of both belonging and ownership. Today's field of tension between external and internal definition of group identity in the Northwest Caucasus will be further explored by drawing on ethnographic data collected during fieldwork in Kabardino-Balkaria from April through July 2008. The focus lies on the continuous process of negotiation between the incongruent institutionalised labels of separate Circassian groups (Kabardian, Cherkess, Adygheian) and locally fostered awareness of pan-Circassian unity. Accordingly, a similar "mismatch" between the institutionally constructed image of Islamism or "Wahhabism" and the self-definition of local Muslims will be examined.

Liturgic Nature of Tradition and National Identity Search Strategy in Modern Georgia: Case of Georgian Banquet

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In the recent debate on the socio-political characteristics of Georgian society and national identity-building, the peculiarities of the Georgian banquet - supra (the autocracy of the Toast-maker, the conventional sequence of toasts) has been mentioned as one of the key markers of Georgian cultural identity and also as a socio-political model of Georgian society. This article differentiates two approaches in analysis of Georgian society – one, neo-liberal, mainly emphasizes socio-political aspects of societal development while the other, traditional, is based on ethnological research.

A neo-liberal approach characterizes the currently practiced Georgian banquet-supra as the only secular ritual “invented in the 19th century tradition”, which as a rhetoric tradition became popular widely mainly during Soviet times. According to this approach continuity of the Georgian banquet with the historic past is largely fictitious, so “traditional” banquet now has lost its importance, as it was only a means for compensation of lost sovereignty. It should be noted that Georgian (and generally Caucasian) guest-host relations as foundations of the Georgian banquet are seen by the followers of this approach as maintaining highly centralized, monologic and autocratic relations in society; so Caucasian hospitality is seen as undemocratic, due to mutually obligatory responsibilities for guest and host; thus Caucasian guest-host relations and Georgian supra are seen as contradictory to the establishment and effective functioning of civil society in Georgia (Caucasus).

Second, traditional, ethnological approach states that traditional Georgian supra by its roots, content and mission was based on a liturgic ritual and syncretic unity of traditions coming from ancient times. As heads of ancient collective supra were usually priests, so toast-making stems from prayer and sacred actions devoted to different deities and cults. Old names of supra - “*tadz-roba*” (*Tadzari* - church), head of banquet “*puris ufali*” - “Lord of Bread”; Georgian saying “Lord Toast-maker” (*Uphali thamada*), found in old Georgian texts and translations of Scripture (11-13 centuries and before) reflect well the religious roots of the Georgian Banquet; prayer formulae have been integrated in the sequence of toasts of Georgian Banquet for a long time, and are considered to be traditional toast formulae today.

The strength of religious roots of the Georgian banquet was clear even during atheistic Soviet times, when traditions of the funeral banquet, toast of “*tsminda salotsavebi*” (sacred places for prayer) and final toast of supra “*kvela tsminda* or *kovlad tsminda*” (all saints or Holy Mother) were emphasized as especially important even in highly urbanized areas. In modern Georgia the growth of the Orthodox parish is notable, so the religious roots and connotations of the Georgian banquet have now become a new cementing component, knitting individual and collective identities together.

The establishment of toast-making contests in the post-Soviet era, and the growing number of banqueting halls and books on toast-making, show that public interest in the

banqueting tradition grows, even as the GNP of the country and wealth of the population has diminished seriously.

Facing Unintended Effects of Diaspora Politics: The Case of Azerbaijan**

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The Azerbaijani national identity has been shaped and reshaped several times during the last hundred or so years. Within only the last two decades Azerbaijani national identity has been modified at least three times from one with dominating Russian components to the one with pan-Turkic disposition to a more uniform Azerbaijanism. And now that the latter seems to be eventually opted for, the diaspora politics Baku has recently embarked on seems to pose a new challenge to the uniformity of this identity and hence to the stability and predictability of Baku's foreign and domestic policy.

The Azerbaijani government is becoming ever more involved with Azerbaijanis living abroad, hoping to use them to influence other states, thereby promoting Baku's foreign policy agenda. Baku's efforts in this direction are making the various members of this community more self-conscious of their identity if not yet a single united group. And this new self-consciousness among Azerbaijanis abroad appears likely over time to have an influence on Azerbaijan itself, irrespective of how much influence they may have on the countries in which they live.

As various scholars have shown, tracing this influence is far from easy. There are simply too many causal chains involved in any particular shift of views either among diaspora communities or among officials and citizens of the Republic of Azerbaijan. But it is clear that this influence exists to a greater or lesser extent, and this essay focuses on four areas where there are some indications that it is already having an impact. Among those are attitudes towards the war with Armenia and the growing sense of nationalism; the content of Azerbaijani national identity with the Baku-led diaspora politics focusing on the cooperation with Turkish diaspora, risking the gradual shift from the inclusive Azerbaijanism to an exclusive Turkic identity; multi-cultural influence on national identity; democratization of the kin-country.

Obviously, the impact of Azerbaijanis living abroad is far broader than on identity issues alone. Thus, although the Azerbaijani community in Iran does not fall under the classic definition of diaspora and is not treated as such by the Azerbaijani government, the Azerbaijani community in Iran may in the longer term become a trigger for a state-sponsored irredentism, as the Azerbaijanis in Iran may increasingly more often call for Azerbaijan's intervention in dealing with violation of their rights in Iran. This in turn may destabilize the still-fragile relations which Azerbaijan has so far managed to establish and keep up with the Iranian state.

This presentation will reflect a research in progress, which has a broader focus going beyond diaspora politics.

Representations of national and ethnic identity in Georgia, South Caucasus

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The Humans are greater,
the more languages they speak.
Georgian proverb

Georgia's multiethnic and multi-religious structure has historically played an important part of its self representation as a nation, and been a factor in the well-known conflicts with Abkhazia and South Ossetia, resulting in the most recent the war against Russia. The persecution of people with different faiths by Georgian Orthodox radicals, the increasing impoverishment of ethnic and religious minorities, and the practices of "Georgization" are also fueling the problems.

For this reason, central to my paper are the national representations⁴ of religious diversity and ethnic minorities, which I will illustrate through the examples of the Armenian and Azerian diaspora. I will tackle the three following questions: Which kind of identity politics is shown in the representations? How is the negotiation process depicted in the representations? In which form is the multiethnic and multireligious structure of the country established as an aspect of the national and when is this diverse structure becoming opposed to the national unity?

My paper is based on ethnological fieldwork carried out in the Georgian capital Tbilisi on three different levels of social life that are identified as key aspects of the post socialist transformations in other countries of Eastern Europe. To reach an accurate picture of the processuality of identity-constructions and the post socialist realm of experiences, I will make a historical comparison of the socialist and post socialist representations.

1. In my study of the public sphere I deal with the identification and contextualization of symbolic points of rupture and gaps, cultural and temporal interfaces in Tbilisi. For this purpose I am considering the new role of the historic neighborhoods as well as the living areas of the Armenian and Azerian minorities, cultural buildings or the renaming of streets, the degradation of historical monuments and the installation of new ones.

2. By focusing my attention on selected religious festivities and the everyday life I investigate the deep impact of religious representations of Georgian identity on the daily private space and on the biographies of Georgian, Armenian and Azerian inhabitants of Tbilisi.

3. Finally, in the analysis I contrast and contextualize the practices of representation in the public sphere and in private spaces. I focus the interviews on the daily experiences of the "makers" and "users" of the city: managers, artists, expats and internally displaced people as well as common inhabitants, with multiethnicity and religiousness, and their relationship with forms of representation in both public and private spaces. It

⁴ Following Hall, Cassierer, Mitchell I examine representations as a form of organization of knowledge on the symbolic level, and as expression of the negotiation process of the social order

is my aim to understand which perceptions of the social order and strategies of representation do the protagonists, as individuals, group and nation, employ, regarding the inner Georgian ethnic and religious conflicts. And moreover, a broad geopolitical level is to be embraced: the positioning as part of the region of South Caucasus, to Russia, at the border between Europe and Asia, East and West, Christianity and Islam.

“Being Between the Two Waters”: Transmission of Ethnic Identity, State Official Narrative, and Imagination among Georgians in Turkey

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This article analyzes the process of cultural transmission among Muslim Georgians in Turkey, mainly inhabited in Artvin Vilayet (Province). It proposes that cultural transmission is a process of remembering as well as imagining. Drawing upon the theoretical conceptualizations of cultural transmission, the article is suggesting that cultural practices of Muslim Georgians in Turkey constitute ways of imagination and memory that often extend beyond the identified ethnicity. These cultural practices are being memorized and imagined through generations and express the sense of belongingness that straddles the indigenous versus alien culture. Crucial in the process of cultural transmission are those mediums through which this process is implemented: social, religious and media spaces. These three media of cultural transmission assist social/cultural negotiation and exchange and as a result create a sense of identity and form process of cultural transmission.

Components of Social Identity and Intentions of Political Activities in Ethnic Minority Youth

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Ethnic minority (Armenian) students, aged between fifteen and eighteen, at Russian language and Armenian language schools and ethnic majority (Georgian) students of Georgian language schools in the capital of Georgia have been asked about the subjective importance of religious, ethnic, national and supranational identities, about trust toward political institutions and about the likelihood of different political activities. Results of the study indicate that strength of ethnic identification in students and school socio-cultural environment have complex influence on young people's political trust in national and international institutions, their involvement in political protest and belief in the effectiveness of political activities. Age differences between ethnic groups in the likelihood of political protest and perceived effectiveness of political activities become significant. In ethnic majority students there is an overall decline in intentions of political protest with age, whereas in the ethnic minority there is a growth of likelihood in political protest involvement, although the possibility of political protest in minorities varies in the different language schools.

In Georgians and Armenians studying in Russian schools, religious identity has highest scores, followed by ethnic identity. In Armenians studying in Armenian schools, ethnic components of identity score highest. Armenians studying in Armenian schools give lower rankings to European identity than Georgians do. Research shows overall a low trust in national political institutions, and especially low among Georgian students. The strength of national and ethnic identification in Georgians correlates with trust in international organizations, when in Armenians ethnic identity strength correlates with trust in concrete international leaders (American and Russian presidents).

The level of ethnic identification and trust in international leaders/organizations in ethnic minorities contributes to the likelihood of participation in peaceful political activities on issues of international relations, when in ethnic majority subjects the level of citizen identification and knowledge of politics are additional factors which lead to active political position. The paper also presents multivariate analyses about the social, religious & ethnic background of minority students, and compares psychological correlates of political participation in the three groups of students.

Collective Identities and Memories in Contemporary Georgia: The Theatre-Scape of Tbilisi

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Looking at the contemporary theatre-scape in Tbilisi, a certain diversity in the field of theatrical expression is striking. Productions based on the interpretation of theatre plays are competing for spectators together with mimes, puppet theatres, classical opera and ballet, as well as musical comedy and folklore dance groups. The origins of one part of the present theatrical institutions in Georgia's capital can be traced back to the middle of the 19th century, when Tbilisi constituted the central point of the Russian empire's conquest of the Caucasus and when theatres implemented by the imperial authorities tended to become a platform to formulate and express national aspirations by local actors. Another group of contemporary theatres have their roots in the Soviet era, while since the end of the 1990s a handful of completely new, in general smaller, theatres have also been founded.

Besides its aesthetic varieties, the theatre-scape of Tbilisi – like the city itself – is far from being linguistically, ethnically and culturally homogeneous: Although the vast majority of performances are held in the Georgian language, there are theatres that operate exclusively in Armenian, Azeri and Russian, as well as institutions which are performing in several languages. Therefore, theatre constitutes one of the city's most important public institutions where – according to divergent communities – often competing collective identities and memories are searched after, negotiated, and represented. It is here where questions concerning cultural distinctiveness are discussed and where identity-formation appears most of all as a performative act. Furthermore, the huge amount of productions which refer to history is very noticeable. With the embodiment of images of the past, theatre seems to function at the same time as a place of their construction and, as well, their dissemination. Moreover, this medium with its

huge storage capacity for memory seems to offer an enormous potential to play through “scenes” of collective historical narratives, while at the same time offering researchers an opportunity to observe the mechanisms of such constructions related to the past.

The presentation will focus on the results of several field research stays conducted in Tbilisi with regard to three theatrical seasons over a period from autumn 2005 to summer 2008. Drafted as a work in progress, it will focus on some fundamental tendencies in the development of Tbilisi’s theatre-scape, also considering the content of productions which were performed after the so-called “Rose-Revolution”. For instance, the nostalgic and sentimental representation of rural and city life in pre-industrial contexts appears to be one tendency in contemporary theatrical discourse on matters of identities, past and origin. As much as they seem to offer comfort to those who experience being uprooted in contemporary urban life, they at the same time tend to hint at latent fragmentations in the collective master narratives. Another noticeable trend is the translation and “naturalization” of plots from international plays and film scripts into an explicitly Georgian context. This could be an indicator of the assumption that definitions and negotiations of what constitutes collective identities and memories in Georgia are not and were never happening in an isolated space.

Traces of Greek-Byzantine and Georgian influence on ancient religious system (folk religion) of Ingushs

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The political and cultural influence of Georgia over Kavkasians, Dzurduks, Dvals, Tsovs (which are direct ancestors of Ingushs- Ghalghaj), during the period of origin and rise of Georgian Kingdom in IV-III AD is well known according both to materials from ancient and medieval Georgian chronicles and hagiographic sources and modern research [L.Mroveli, D.Dzuansheriani, V.N.Gamrekeli].

Productive contacts between Georgia and Ingush ancestors Dzurduks, Dvals (western-Ingush community), Tsovs, Ghlighves (Georgian name for Ghalghaj- selfname of Ingushs) can be traced through in the course of the Georgian Kingdom’s history up to the 18th century. [Pamyatnik Eristavov, V. Bagrationi].

The process of the Christianizing of Georgia and Ingushs (known from ancient and medieval Georgian sources under names of Kavkasians, Dzurduks, Dvals, Tsovs) which had started back in the fourth century AD, the building of chapels and Christian temples in Highland Ingusheti (Thaba-erda, Albi-erda, Targimskij hram, Magote) and the political and cultural influence of Georgia in medieval Ingusheti had reached its apogee in the times of Georgian Queen Tamar’s rule (1184-1213). Those relations between Georgia and Ingusheti were so close that, according to V.Bagrationi’s evidence, until the 18th century Ingushs ("the Caucasian tribes of Kists, Ghlighves, Dzurduks") spoke the Georgian language.

Many rituals and religious ceremonials as well as songs and round-dances of folk religion of Ingushs have a striking similarity with those of neighbouring Tushs, Khevsurs, Pshavs from Eastern Georgian Highlands ethnographic provinces of Tusheti, Khevsureti and Pshavi. [K. Tuite, P. Bukhrashvili, S. Kurtsikidze, V. Chikovani, Ch.

Ahriev]. It is worth mentioning here the name of Dælə/Dæl , the sole god of Ghalghaj-Ingushs: "Their religion is extremely plain, but has clear traces of Christianity. They believe in sole God whom they call Diala, but they accept none of saints or religiously remarkable personalities." [Güldenstädt, J.]. One can read about connection between Ingush Dælə/Dæl and Svan Dæl in K. Tuite's 'The meaning of DÆL'.

In contrast to the cultural , political and religious influence of Georgia in Ingusheti from ancient times, which is well researched and widely known to scholars , the cultural and religious impact of Christianity of Greek-Byzantine's world on ancient religious system of Ingushs remains a nearly untouched theme.

Comparison and analysis of all accessible materials of folklore and ethnography, history and architecture of Ingushs with corresponding facts of Byzantine history and Greek-Byzantine church architecture gives us the notion of the considerable influence of Byzantine on folk religion and on the architecture of Ingushs.

Comparison of architectural details of the Ingush Christian temple Thaba-erda (IX AD) and war towers with medieval Byzantine church architecture and Byzantine cross (image of it appears on Byzantine golden solids under the period of emperors Tiberius II Constantinus (578-583), Heraclius (610-641), Constans II(654-659), Justinianus II (first reign 685-695, second 705-711), with the first image of Christ on byzantine coins, later to become a standard image, and finally Basilus II and Constantinus VIII (976-1025)) allows us to note striking traits common to them. The very same Byzantine crosses can be seen on various community shrines preserved to this day in Highland Ingusheti (Magote or Mago-erda shrine in the vicinity of Ingush tower village Salgi). [S. Linner; www.ellopos.net].

Materials on patronymic genealogies of Ingush families from the Dzhejrah community of Highland Ingusheti, associating of Ingush god Dælə/Dæl with sun, archeological findings of Byzantine solids from the period of emperors Theodosius II (408-450) and Anastasius I (491-518), as well as other facts from folklore and customary law of Ingushs, all allow us to trace productive contacts between Ingushs and the Greek-Byzantine world in antiquity and middle ages. [A. Henrikson, Ch. Ahriev].

Preservation of Identity Through Integration: the Case of Javakheti Armenians

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In this paper, I will present a short historical overview of the Javakheti region of Georgia, and its predominantly Armenian population. The paper will try to find answers to such questions as what the identity of the Javakheti Armenians is, and where the current situation in Georgia will lead this ethnic minority.

The Armenians in Javakheti are considered not a Diaspora but an indigenous people who have lived there for centuries. The transition period, which was marked by the collapse of the Soviet Empire, was a turning point for the Javakheti Armenians, who

became a national minority in a multiethnic Georgian independent state. Being deprived of an autonomy within the Georgian state, the Javakheti Armenians have maintained their Armenian identity by preservation of language, culture and traditions. Currently, it is possible to speak about their being more integrated – culturally, economically and politically – to Armenia, than to Georgia. The languages that are used by the community are Armenian and Russian, while Georgian remains simply the language used in bureaucracy.

With the strong Armenian identity prevailing, there have been numerous attempts of 'Georgianization' of the community members, attempts that did not work due to certain policies held by the Georgian state towards its national minorities. The present geopolitical situation of both the Georgian state and the region in general, gives cause for serious concern about the security and the future of the Javakheti Armenians. With the withdrawal of Russian troops from Javakheti, recent tragic events in South Ossetia, Russia's occupation of Georgia and Georgia's present political orientation towards Turkey and NATO, the Armenian population of the region can feel a threat to its own safety. This can be explained by the historical proceedings of the neighbouring countries' relations, i.e. absence of diplomatic relations between Armenia and Turkey, (its reason being non-recognition of the Armenian Genocide by the Turkish state,) the existence of a frozen conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan, and the present regional allies.

Leaving aside all the problematic issues both peoples, namely Armenians and Georgians, have had in the past, this paper will focus on the future and how important is the preservation of the Javakheti Armenian community for both countries. However, the well-being of the community members, with the preservation of their basic needs which involve the issue of identity, which will lead to a stronger integration into the Georgian state and its political and social life, depends on a certain status (i.e. cultural autonomy, freedom of political expression and encouragement of Armenian participation in Georgian political and cultural life, as well as involvement of Armenia into more systematic steps related to Armenian people of Javakheti) being provided by the Georgian state.

Therefore, by analyzing the situation of the present Javakheti Armenians, I will bring forward suggestions of how it is possible to optimally integrate the Armenian community into the Georgian multinational and multicultural society, and help in strengthening the Armenia-Georgia relationship by means of thoughtful policies from the side of the Georgian state towards its national minorities, as well as a more systematic participation of Armenia in the life of the community.

The Mountain Jewish Community of the Republic of Azerbaijan**

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The Mountain Jewish Community of Azerbaijan has a centuries-old history, and its distinct and rich culture has aroused the interest of renowned scholars. Being a part of Eastern Jewry, the Mountain Jews trace their history back to the Biblical times of the first exile by the Assyrians. The Community has its own language of Juhuri, which is a part of Judeo-Persian group of languages, and most probably started its development from the Sassanian period.

Modern trends of migration and economy have reshaped the community and scattered its representatives throughout the world.

The Figure of a Repatriate in Armenian Contemporary Dramatic Art**

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Since the 20th century twice as many Armenians have lived outside Armenia than within it. A new flow of repatriation has been noticed since Armenia gained independence (1991). When the presence of the repatriates was quite noticeable in Armenia a new personage appeared in the Armenian contemporary dramatic art – the comic figure of a repatriate. This personage is endowed with the following main characteristics:

Romantic patriotism: The cult of some ethnic symbols (Mountain of Ararat, the Armenian earth or water, etc.) is one of the frequently demonstrated attributes of this personage. This cult often stimulates the repatriate to amusingly irrational actions. In addition, taking advantage of the romantic patriotism of this personage, the figure of a local tries time and again to swindle him.

Naivety: As a rule the repatriate is presented as a kind but naive person. Living away from Armenia he is not familiar with the customs and habits of the locals. Because of this his actions are often presented as too naïve.

The repatriate as a mentor: Sometimes he is presented as a self-styled mentor, who has lived in more developed country, with a better quality of life and now aims to introduce the local to a better life-style. But being unfamiliar with the locals' life conditions he generally gives absolutely unrealistic advice, to comic effect.

Language specifics: While creating the personage of the repatriate a special attention is devoted to the parody of his language (western Armenian) which quite differs from the local's language (eastern Armenian).

These are the main characteristics inherent to the one of the popular personages of Armenian contemporary dramatic art - the repatriate. This personage, often appearing together with the local (who is also frequently mocked) demonstrates the locals' general view on repatriates, as well as their perception of the differences between themselves and repatriates.

Identity Formation among Georgian Migrants to the Baltic States**

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Incorporated into the Russian Empire and later into the Soviet Union for several centuries, Georgians and the Baltic peoples shared similar fate and have been in close cultural relationships. This was strengthened by the significant migration flows between the two regions. After the disintegration of the USSR, and particularly during recent years, the relationship between the Caucasus and the Baltic states got re-established, and therefore also the migration between the two regions grows. There are different reasons for people migrating for a short or long time period, whether it is in search of education, employment, better economic opportunities, or family reunion.

The aim of this paper is to pinpoint those aspects of Georgian cultural identity that undergo major change after migration to the Baltic States. The paper will present the results of the sociological field research conducted through the use of qualitative research methods. The study is based on theoretical concepts of national identity and nationalism, particularly, on the comparison between civic and ethnic nationalisms, in accordance with the definitions and concepts developed the last decades by such researchers as Eric Hobsbaum, Benedict Anderson, Miroslav Hroch, Ernest Gellner, and others. In addition, I will consider how far are still relevant for migrants to the Baltic region the concepts of the basic parameters of the national identity of Georgians as developed by the founder of contemporary Georgian nationalism Ilya Chavchavadze, aimed at the consolidation of the Georgian nation – fatherland / territory; language, confession (Eastern Orthodox Christianity).

The following aspects of identity of the Georgian migrants are also studied within the framework of the field research, – different dimensions of the Georgian national character (ethnic, sub-ethnic and supra-ethnic levels of identity, correlation and relationship with the Baltic and the Russian (Russian-speaker) identities within the Baltic societies; correlation with the level of integration/assimilation within the host society; level of education, profession, geography of domicile (urban/rural, host community), religious affiliation, language proficiency or skills, age, migration path and timing, ethnic family structure, interpretation of the Georgian national project or of the Soviet legacy, etc.) – based on cultural, emotional and practical levels of everyday life. The role and the place of the Georgian diaspora communities in the Baltic countries are studied from the viewpoint of their influence.

The method of qualitative interviews is used, actually 6-10 semi structured questionnaires using internet communication – e-mail, Skype, etc. Based upon the operationalization of initial theoretical concepts, a number of simple questions are

developed and sent to potential respondents. Since the questions are semi-structured, all respondents have an opportunity to add their own opinion. Both English and Russian are used as working languages for communicating with the respondents.

Main findings of the research are aimed to contribute to a better understanding of national identity formation and nationalism of specific (Georgian migrant) communities, of their understanding of the realities of both the globalized world and of the local/cultural context of the surrounding Baltic and Russian communities in the Baltic states.

Section 5: Language contact and migration

On the Use of the Root *q'ru*- “deaf”. Analyzing Old, Middle and Modern Georgian Literary Texts

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The paper studies the usage of the word *q'ru* “deaf” in Georgian literature for a period from 6th century AD up to the modern literary texts (the works of about sixty three authors including anonymous compositions), also, ancient as well as modern translations of some verses of Old and New Testament containing the root *q'ru* “deaf”.

The study revealed some tendencies which could be traced through the long history of Georgian literature. Namely, the texts dated back to the period of 6th 12th cc., including ancient biblical versions, employ the root *q'ru* only in the form of a noun (multiple occurrences) or an adjective. The *q'ru* is mainly used in the ancient texts (a) to express physical condition (deafness) [Ex. 4:11, Lev 19:14, Js 29:18, Js 35:5, Ps 38:13]; (b) to metaphorically use of men who will not hear the prophets and obey the law [Js 43:8].

There is an interesting case of an extra usage of the noun *q'ru* in Deut 15:21: Neither Greek translation¹ nor Massoretic text contains the word denoting “deaf” (*q'ru*) in Deut 15:21, which anyway is given in the Ancient Georgian translation. The translator adds the extra word to the list of health impairments.

According to the analyzed texts of the VI-XVIII centuries, the root *q'ru* “deaf” is mainly used as a noun, with the primary meaning (*asuli šobitgan q'ru* “a daughter born deaf”, (Giorgi Merchuli, 10th c.) or in a metaphoric way (... *da hmsaxurebdes k'erp'ta q'ru* “and they had served the deaf idols” (anonymous author, Martyrdom of St. Eustathe of Mtskheta, 6th century)). However, the root occasionally occurs in verb forms and deverbal nominals as well (e.g., *siq'ruve* used in Visramiani, Sargis of Tmogvi, 13th century).

1. uneducated, retarded, abandoned or aged person;
2. an empty or abandoned place/location;
3. low, unclear voice;
4. lack of sense and meaning;
5. insensitivity.

It is noteworthy that the root *q'ru* is used in various swearing and cursing formulas (1), (2).

The analysis of the word *q'ru* “deaf” in the Georgian literature represents an attempt to look at the written language as a material essential for understanding the tendencies and attitudes that have been established in Georgia during the long period of history. On a basis of the examined material we can conclude that the 1 meaning of the word *q'ru*

“deaf” and its derivatives acquired negative meaning. We learn about attitudes towards deafness during these centuries from looking at the change in the use of the word.

The reasons for the changes in the meaning could be low awareness and some fears of the hearing part of the population towards the deaf community itself and its problems. Stigma and stereotypes related to the deaf community could be the result of lack of communication between the hearing part and the deaf community that finally led to marginalization of this part of the society.

Further studies could facilitate their integration in society and make it possible to avoid barriers to development and participation. As for the further prospect of comprehensive study on the deaf community it would be worthwhile to incorporate deaf history specialists in order to study the history of the deaf community within the Georgian history context.

This paper could be a preliminary research attempting to understand the attitudes towards deaf world in a hearing world that is reflected in literature, and could be one of the preliminary steps in further investigating the sociolinguistic situation of the deaf community in Georgia. Multidisciplinary study on the deaf community of Georgia will facilitate understanding disability and society, deafness as a social, psychological and sociocultural phenomenon, establishment of tolerant hearing society and hopefully, will help to reduce and eventually remove barriers to integration of deaf community in society.

(1) (A swearing formula in *mok'vetili* by Važa-Pšavela, 19th century)

še sulelo, še gada-q'ru-ebul-o(!)
you.SG stupid you.SG PV-deaf-SUFF-VOC
Lit.: You stupid, you deafened-away!

(2) (Cursing formulas)

a. (In *p'ac'ia megobrebi* by Niko Lomouri, 19th century)

dagaq'ruot, dagaq'ruot mamičemis salocaveb-ma!...
Let.them.deafen.you.PL let.them.deafen.you.PL my.father's shrines-ERG
Lit.: Let my father's shrines deafen, deafen you!

b. (In *geri da dedinacvali* by Otia Ioseliani, 20th century)

dagaq'rua čemma gamčenma.
(s)he.made.you.SG.deafened my Lord
Lit.: Let my Lord deafen you.

Migration and perspectives for research of linguistic problems connected to migration processes in the 20 century's Georgia

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Several powerful migration waves in the 20th century essentially changed the language and dialectal map of Georgia. Along with migrations forced by armed conflicts, migrations caused by ecological and other factors have also taken place and are still going on in Georgia.

Documentation and exploration of migration processes in Georgia, as well as gathering and investigation of linguistic materials connected to the migration processes in Georgia have been carried out within the frames of two projects: *Language situation in modern Georgia* (financed by Volkswagen-Stiftung) and *Linguistic portrait of Georgia* (Rustaveli Foundation). The materials are being prepared for interdisciplinary investigations.

Our presentation emphasizes the opportunities of a dialect corpus as a tool for exploration and researching narratives and other linguistic materials connected to migration processes. The Georgian dialect corpus and a database for cartography of migration processes will be presented.

As a result of systematisation of the dialectal texts the Georgian dialect corpus reflects main linguistic, sociolinguistic, and cultural changes caused by migration processes in the 20th century.

The Problems of Learning and Teaching of the State Language In Some Regions of Georgia

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The main direction of modern Georgian language policy is to support the multilingualism in Georgia, i. e. Linguistic humanism – typical to the state, issues of establishment and retaining of national and cultural identity, which in its turn requires necessity of social integration based on mutual respect in regards to language and culture. Thus, linguistic humanism is not only the tool but also the feature of a tolerant society.

The paper will deal with the problem of the learning and teaching of Georgian as the state language in two regions of Georgia – Kvemo Kartli and Samtskhe-Javakheti. This problem is often hindered by the soviet heritage of Georgia. I will compare the level and degree of learning and teaching of the Georgian state language in the Soviet and post-Soviet periods.

Traditions and innovations in mountain Daghestan

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The paper aims at investigating social structure and dynamics of changes in traditional mountain Daghestan society.

Archi belongs to the Lezgian group of the East Caucasian (Nakh-Daghestanian) family. Archi speakers (about 1300) live compactly in several small villages in the central part of the high-mountain Daghestan. Until very recently, the language has been unwritten (the recent Cyrillic-based orthography is not very much in use, yet). The Archis live in a multilingual environment, surrounded by Laks and Avars, whose languages are only very remotely related to Archi.

At home, the Archis speak Archi only. When children first go to school, they only know Archi and none of the major languages. The school education on the other hand is exclusively in Avar (in primary school), to which Russian is added later (in secondary school).

In order to understand what factors influenced the changes of the Archi community during the last century, in 2006-2008 I conducted research into school education in the village, since school was the main channel of external influence on Archi society.

A Soviet school opened in the beginning of the 1930s. There were no Archi school teachers at that time, since the Archis began to get secular education later. Thus, Archi people were taught by Avars and Russians who often considered them backward and ignorant. School teachers were the main channels of innovations in Archi traditional society. I identified several social values of Archis which have become especially important since the 1930s, including the attitude towards the Archi ethnic identity, the attitude towards Archi language, the social and cultural position of women, and religion.

The Archis born in the 1920s through to 1950 often said that they don't like their language, since it is (conceptually) poor and nobody knows it; for this reason they do not consider it necessary to develop the language by creating a writing system or by teaching Archi at school. Meanwhile, the younger generation is much more loyal towards their language and identity and express their wish to maintain the language. The main reason for this difference, in my opinion, are the changes in Archi school: since the beginning of the 70s Archi people have started working as teachers, and since the 90s there have been no non-Archi teachers in the village.

Soviet school was the main factor in changes in women's way of life. Until the mid 50s, girls rarely went to school, since the Archis considered education for women as contradicting the norms of shariat (Islamic religious codex). In the 50s, girls used to go to school wearing their traditional clothes (so-called *kaz* and *chuxtu*). In the 60s, however, the traditional clothes was forbidden and for a certain period girls changed their clothes on the way to school and back. In the 70s, more educated and intellectual young woman started to abandon their traditional clothes.

There were several female Russian teachers in Archi school whose way of life also influenced Archi women. From several old Archi women teachers I gathered evidence that the main reason for getting high education was their admiration for Russian women teaching in the village. Compared with their neighbors, Archis were more conservative and started innovations much later. Today it is obvious that their conservatism saved their language and ethnic integrity, since today they are the largest and most developed village in the region, while Avar and Lak villages show apparent decay, primarily because of the migration to bigger towns.

On Syntactic Isoglosses between Ossetic and Kartvelian: The Case of Negation

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In my paper, I argue that both the syntax and morphology of negation in Ossetic have been shaped by contacts with the Kartvelian languages. To substantiate this claim, I compare the Ossetic system to the ones existing in other Iranian languages on the one hand, and in the neighboring languages of the Caucasus on the other. Ossetic negative markers depend on the mood and are adjacent to the verb. They can be separated from the verb only by 2P clitics:

- (1) a. Nɐ =jɐ žon-yn⁵
 NEG =ACC.3SG know-PRS.1SG
 ‘I don’t know him/her.’
- b. Ma =jɐ a-fxɐr/
 * Nɐ=jɐ a-fxɐr
 NEG.NON-IND =ACC.3SG PREV-insult:IMP.2SG
 ‘Do not insult him/her!’

Negative pronouns are formed by combination of the negative marker, which again depends on the mood, with a *wh*-word (2a, b, c). They cannot co-occur with the preverbal negative marker, and also immediately precede the verb (2b). Multiple negative pronouns may co-occur, (2b). They can be separated from the verb only by 2P clitics (2a), and comparative adverbials (2c).

- (2) a. Ni-kɐj =zy (*nɐ) fed-ton
 NEG-who:ACC =LOC.3SG NEG see:PSTTR:PST.1SG
 ‘I haven’t seen anybody there.’
- b. Ma-kɐj ma-kɐd (*ma) a-fxɐr!
 NEG.NON.IND-who:ACC NEG.NON.IND-when NEG PREV-insult:IMP.2SG
 ‘Never insult anybody!’

⁵ Ossetic examples were collected during field trips to North Ossetia in 2007 and 2008. All examples here are from Iron Ossetic, the situation in the second Ossetic dialect, Digor, is completely similar.

- c. šošlan madin-ej ni-kej **fylder** warž-ta.
 Soslan Madina-ABL NEG-who:ACC stronger love-TR:PST.3SG
 ‘Soslan never loved anybody stronger than he loved Madina.’

Thus it is possible to speak of “negative movement”: negative pronouns are obligatorily moved into the preverbal position. Constituent negation does not exist in Ossetic.

This situation is unique for Iranian languages, where the same series of pronouns serves as indefinites and, when the preverbal negation is present, as negative pronouns (see Haspelmath 1997 for Persian). There is no restriction on their position in the clause. Thus the Ossetic system is likely to be an innovation. However, all these properties (except the ban on the double negation) are directly matched by Kartvelian languages (see Vogt 1971 for Georgian):

- (3) a. Georgian
 nu-ra-vis nu-ras-odes
 NEG.IMP-INT.PRON-who:DAT NEG.IMP-INT.PRON-when
 nu-ra-per-ze (nu) et’q’vi uar-s
 NEG.IMP-INT.PRON-color-ON NEG.IMP you.will.tell.it.to.him/her refusal-DAT
 ‘Never refuse anything to anybody whatever it be!’
- b. nura-vi-s nura-sodes nuraper-ze uar-s *(nu) et’q’vi

Other Caucasian languages in direct contact with Ossetic, namely, the West Caucasian and the Vaynakh, have fairly different systems of negation: negative pronouns there are not based on wh-words, their form does not depend on the mood of the verb, no analogue of “negative movement” exists there, and the negative markers do not always precede the verb (see, a.o., Imnaishvili 1953; Nichols 1994a,b; Rogava, Kerasheva 1966).

All this suggests that the modern system of negation in Ossetic has undergone a strong Kartvelian influence. The obligatory ‘negative movement’ is virtually unattested in the languages of the world, which both increases the plausibility of this conjecture and makes the Ossetic and Georgian case particularly interesting for the typology of negation.

Iranian Languages in the Caucasus

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I. Preamble.

Language unity presumes the spreading of the structural language features of the unrelated languages beyond the language borders of the special geographical regions (areas). Linguists discuss the problem related to the Language Unity in the Caucasus without any meaningful result. The problem becomes more complicated because of the genesis of the Caucasian languages. On the one hand, there we have three diverse language families without approved genetic unity. On the other hand, the group of the linguists considers the common genesis of the language families as approved. In any case, currently we do not have any available linguistic evidence in support of Caucasian language unity. Much more fruitful is the investigation of the confined linguistic units.

II. Iranian languages in the Caucasus, their history and current status.

In the Caucasus the Iranian languages are represented by three languages:

- 1) Ossetic is spread in the Central Caucasus and belongs to the North-East group of Iranian Languages;
- 2) Tati is found in Dagestan and Azerbaijan; it belongs to the South-West group of the Iranian Languages; the Tati language of Dagestan (North Tati) differs from the Tati language of Azerbaijan (South Tati). The native speakers of north and south Tati also differ from each other in terms of faith: The Tati people in Dagestan are Jews whereas the Tats in Azerbaijan are Muslim.
- 3) Talishi is spoken in Azerbaijan; it belongs to the North-West group of the Iranian Languages. It must be specially emphasized, that the Talishi of Iran, the so-called South dialect of Talishi, differs from the North Talishi (Masuley dialect) of Azerbaijan. The presentation is based on the North Talishi (Masuley).

There is an opinion that considers the Kurdish Language one of the Iranian Languages of the Caucasus as well. Nevertheless, Kurdish language contacts are not carried out in the presentation.

Two of the above-mentioned languages – Ossetic and Tati – are present solely in the Caucasus. Talishi is spoken in the Caucasus (Azerbaijan) as well as in Iran. Talishi and South Tati were/are in contact with the Azerbaijani (Azeri) language. Tati language of Dagestan was in contact with the Kumik language, a lingua franca in the Caucasus for several hundred years.

Due to the contacts with Turkic languages in Talishi and Tati languages developed the following features:

1. Appearance of the partial synharmonizm in vocal system (Talishi);
2. Appearance of the umlaut (u <ö) (Talishi);
3. Behavior of the verb *pie* “love, want, wish” that is presented in ergative form in all tenses and moods (Talishi);
4. The forms of optative are eliminated; the new analytical forms appeared instead of them (South Tati);
5. Diffusion of the so-called Turkic izaphet instead of the Iranian izaphet (South Tati).

So, the Iranian and Turkic language contacts in the Caucasus seems to us a productive way to find out valuable isoglosses.

The Ossetic language was in contact with the Kartvelian, Abkhaz-Adyge and Nakh-Dagestanian languages.

III. In the presentation we will try to demonstrate the contacts of the Iranian languages of the Caucasus with the other languages of the Caucasus and demonstrate its prospect for both disciplines – Caucasology and Iranian studies.

On borrowed affixes in Megrelian**

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It is well-known that borrowing of morphological elements – affixes - is possible only in the condition of intensive relation of languages. We have the situation in Megrelian-Laz (Zan), on which the influence of the Georgian literary language and dialects is great. Here we offer some examples:

1. A Megrelian word-formative *no-* corresponds with Georgian *na-*, but the latter is already established in Megrelian: *na-č'ara* “written”, *na-xant'a* “drawn”, *na-gvazu* (toponymy) and so forth. Sometimes proper and borrowed prefixes occur in parallel, e. g.: *no-ṗudu* // *na-ṗudu* “a ruined dwelling”.
2. A proper *-at* as well as a borrowed *-et* is attested for forming the geographic names. We have: *k'ax-at-i*, *zan-at-i*, *tek'l-at-i* on one hand, and *šon-et-i*, *sepi-et-i*, *mogv-et-i*, on the other.
3. Circumfix *sa – o* borrowing from Georgian is used in Megrelian toponyms: *sa-margal-o* “Samegrelo”, *sa-adam-o* (toponymy), *sa-mika-o* (toponymy) and so forth.
4. In Megrelian along with *-a*, *-e* of passive voice formative of the Georgian literary language occurs: *e-ndebu* “smb. trusts”, *e-saxelebu* “smb. is proud”, *e-č'iparebu* “smth. is getting smaller for smb.”... (cf.: *a-xašu* “It is being boiled for smb.”, *a-tasu* “It is being sown for smb.”, *a-xant'u* “It is being drawn for smb.”...).
5. A proper *o-* and a borrowed *a-* occur in Megrelian verbs of a so-called neutral version: *o-rc'q'e* “smb. sees”, *o-k'vire* “smb. observes”, *o-dinuans* “smb. loses”... *a-rc'ielens* “smb. Is turning smth. white”, *a-xerxens* “smb. manages”...

A trace of the close relation between the Megrelian-Laz and Abkhaz languages is observable in both languages, in particular, T. Gudava and V. Shengelia consider a postposition *-t* as a suffix (Megr. *sopelša-x* “as far as a village”, *ṗudeša-x* “as far as a home”, *ek'o-x* “above”...) and a particle *-ga* (Megr. *mid-ga* “somebody”, *mud-ga* “something”, *sod-ga* “somewhere”...) to be assimilated from Abkhaz in Megrelian.

National Schools of Abkhazia and region of Tskhinvali, and their Analogues in the Past and Future

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1. Today, in Abkhazia and in the region of Tskhinvali there are Abkhazian and Ossetian national schools, which are working according to the following structure:

- Education in schools lasts 11 years (I-XI)
- Education has three levels. At the first level, which lasts 4 year, pupil are studying almost all subjects in their native language, but also are learning Russian to a very high standard. At second and third level all disciplines are taught in the Russian language except for two humanities subjects (native language, native literature)

Because of these peculiarities we must conclude that the schools in both region are only conditionally national.

2. Synchronical analogues of Abkhazian and Ossetian “national” schools are not only “national” schools in the North Caucasian republics, but all the “national” schools in the republics of the Russian Federation, where at the second and third level most of the subjects are taught in the Russian language.

3. Historical analogues of Abkhazian And Ossetian “national” schools are parochial schools in the Russian empire of the 19th century (from second period), at which teaching in the native language was allowed only in the first year, after which every subject was taught only in Russian. Ideologists of Tsarism make no secret of the fact that in such schools, the purpose was not to learn the native language, but to allow the studying of the Russian language better, and the Rusification of non-Russian pupils.

4. Unfortunately, present-day Abkhazian and Ossetian national schools are helping the intensive process of denationalization of pupils in Abkhazian and Ossetian. A reform is necessary there, otherwise the existence of Abkhazian and Ossetian languages will be in jeopardy.

Typology of sociolinguistic situation: an experience of contrastive analyses of the lingual policy in Tunisia and Armenia**

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Comparative research in linguistics recently acquired a new dimension. It is now focusing on comparison of various language materials to identify the common features or differences, but also includes methods of comparison that use the contrasts emerging as a result of the analysis of comparable language facts.

The method of contrastive approach is mostly applicable to sociolinguistic studies. Such contrastive comparison is based on the following scheme: the range of extra-lingual factors that influence the lingual situation inside the given community, alongside its differences, has a common layer, and is motivated by globalization processes. These processes may in some cases be manifested by implicit features, while in other cases may be situated “on the surface”.

One of the basic conditions for the assessment of the lingual situation is consideration of the inevitable role of foreign languages inside the given community. It depends on certain historical processes, - the geographical, social and cultural characteristics of the region, its ties with the former colonial power, as well as on the level of its involvement in global processes and the social structure of society.

From this point of view the contrastive analyses of the lingual situation in Tunisia and Armenia can be significantly fruitful, because along with the external differences, the in-depth sociolinguistic structure reveals some typical commonalities that affect the lingual policy. These are: the ethnic homogeneity of the society, continuous interaction with the cultural and lingual area of the former colonial power, as well as a number of other features. The contrastive comparison of such features can indicate some new aspects of sociolinguistic analysis.

Multiple Deportations, Semilingualism, and Compensatory Education: A Case of Meskhetian Repatriates in Western Georgia

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The present paper is based upon the survey conducted at the settlement of Meskhetian repatriates in the village of Ianeti, Samtredia District, Western Georgia.

As is known, in 1944 the population of Meskheta (a south-eastern province of Georgia), frequently referred to as either ‘Meskhetian Turks’ or ‘Turkish Meskhetians’ or ‘Moslem Meskhetians’, were deported to Central Asia. Late in the 20th century, a greater part of them were ousted from Uzbekistan due to the unrest in Ferghana Region. Afterwards, various groups of Meskhetians settled in Azerbaijan, Russia, and USA, among other places.

Most of the members of our target group moved from Central Asia to Kabardino-Balkaria, Russia, in the 1960s, and then, in the 1990s, to Georgia. Several dozen Meskhetian informants of both genders and various ages took part in the survey. Irrespective of the fact that the overwhelming majority of them declared Georgian to be their mother tongue, they speak, as they refer to it, 'Meskhetian' as their vernacular (actually it is one of the dialects of Turkish). It is noteworthy that due to the same background, most of the pre-school children do not speak Georgian (either fluently or at all). As there is no kindergarten in the village (more exactly, in their part of it; their settlement is approximately eight kilometers far from Ianeti proper), the linguistic socialization of Meskhetian children begins when they enter school. Naturally enough, their linguistic socialization can be less than perfect, and, therefore, many of them, both children and adults, are semilingual. Only adult men between their 40s and 60s are multilingual, speaking Georgian, Turkish, Russian, Uzbek, Kabardian, etc.

As a rule, such linguistic deficit is normally converted into social and even economic deficits (problems include access to further education, to non-agricultural employment, etc.).

Based on the positive experience in many western countries, we propose some measures of compensatory education, namely, to open a kindergarten, to enhance teaching of Georgian (and other languages) in the local comprehensive school, etc.

On the Caucasus' influence on the Persian language. The Synchronic Data for the History of Azerbaijanian – Persian Language Contacts

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There are two main viewpoints on the history of linguistic interrelations between Azerbaijanian and Persian ethnic groups. According to traditional doctrine, the ethnic and language contacts between the above mentioned peoples begin from the Turkish conquest in the 11th century. According to some other sources, Azerbaijanian–Persian language and ethnic contacts have been occurring for 25 centuries. Despite the considerable existing divergences of researchers' viewpoints on the linguistic interrelations and interference of Azerbaijanian and Persian in the times past all of them come to one common denominator – the Azerbaijanian and Persian populations in the span of vast time are in a state of non-stop proximal interference. In our opinion, the progressive changes of morphological structure Old Persian came about as a result of mutual influence of classical agglutinate, as well as analytical Old (Proto-) Azerbaijanian and classical fusion, as well as synthetic Old Persian.

The conducted analysis of the Modern Persian linguistic materials, with the aim of finding in it the traits of definite morphological type, found out more than 20 indications of different levels, bonding with agglutinative technique of morpheme connection as the constituents of lexical forms, most of which were not observed in Old Persian up to the active interrelations with the speakers of Old Azerbaijanian. This fact allows us to define Modern Persian as the language of agglutinative morphological type (and rate

Modern Persian as one of the new agglutinate languages). The presence of a special class of complex words, parts of which may be used independently – complex verbs, the presence of independent stem-roots, the increasing affixation from words, monosemantic affixes, the absence of the words' subdivision as to the stems (so called declining), the presence of post-syllable *-ra*, the minimal quantity of prefixes and the large quantity of suffixes, isolation and independence of affixes (the possibility of their usage on distance, and also s called group forming), the presence of a morphological way of reduplication, facultativeness (that may or may not occur) of some morphological indexes, the existence of incorporation – these are the features Persian gained during interference.

Political Framing of Language and Language Policy in Post-Soviet Azerbaijan

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This paper analyzes the political role that language and language policy have played in Azerbaijan by contrasting the shifting attitudes of the Azerbaijani government and the political opposition, while also describing how Azerbaijani language politics fits within both a post-colonial framework and the greater post-Soviet language politics literature. The conclusions of this paper are largely based on interviews with political figures conducted by the author in Baku, Azerbaijan in 2005-2006, as well as primary textual sources.

The analysis argues that the government of Əbülfəz Əlibəy (1992-1993) behaved in a classic post-colonial manner by emphasizing Azeri's paramount importance to Azerbaijan and attempting to distance the Azeri language from Russian influences, perceiving the Russian language as a proxy for Russian colonial domination. The subsequent government of Heydar Əliyev (1993-2003) wielded its predecessor's nationalism and pan-Turkism against its opposition, which was largely formed from the remnants of the Əlibəy government. It claimed that such positions had needlessly distanced Azerbaijan from Russia and estranged Azerbaijan's ethnic minorities; the Əliyev government was thus more open to the use of the Russian language. At the same time, the new government claimed the linguistic nationalist mantle for itself by focusing on the Azeri language's uniqueness in its rhetoric, in contrast to the pan-Turkic leanings of the Əlibəy government. As in other post-Soviet states, the government attempted to tie linguistic and cultural revitalization to the country's president: Heydar Əliyev's perceived longstanding support of the Azeri language and his government's successful implementation of a script change from Cyrillic to Latin were used as evidence of the government's support for developing a strong Azeri identity.

A relatively stable linguistic status quo has since come into being, with all sides of the political spectrum agreeing about the importance of Azeri to the Azerbaijan state, as well as the need to respect both the Russian language and minority languages. Tension in the sphere of language politics now exists in the opposition's contention that the government of İlham Əliyev (2003-present) is overly russified, which some believe

hinders a shift toward increased use of English and slows the development and spread of the Azeri language.

Indeed, this analysis argues that the focus on language in Azerbaijan has largely been symbolic: little official attention has been paid toward developing the Azeri language or aiding the learning of Azeri outside of school coursework, as a general consensus holds that these processes should (and will) occur naturally, with little government intervention. While speakers of minority languages are lauded for learning the Azeri language, which is seen as a prerequisite for success, minority languages themselves are subject to ambiguity in that the government regards minorities as both symbolic assets to the state and a potential danger. As a result, minority languages have been relegated to being part of a policy of predominantly symbolic promotion of reified national identities, a strategy strongly reminiscent of the Soviet era.

The Influence of Globalization Processes on the Languages without Scripts (Based on Tsova-Tushian (Batsbi) materials)

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Intensive Globalization processes, characteristic of the modern world, have a painful influence upon the languages of small nations, especially upon the languages without scripts. Disappearance of the languages will cause disappearance of the culture of the nations. This is what we call the humanitarian catastrophe. In connection with this fact we assume it is very important to create a lever which would help the consolidation of internal lingual processes to overcome the internal social influence, as well as political ones. This is quite a complicated task, because for Tsova-Tushian language, the basis of our report, there are many factors that help hasten the self-isolation process.

The roots of Tsova-Tushian history and culture are connected with Georgian ethnos, but the language itself is a symbiosis of the Old Georgian and Vainakhian languages. Nowadays 30% of the whole population (of more than 1000 people) We will try to explore the gradual transformation of the language and consider the reasons that caused these lamentable results. This is basically connected with social processes that we are going to explore are so original and so transparent, that they are well connected with chronological characteristic processes and help us find the real reason why the language lost its self-identity and why it is threatened with disappearance.

The most original thing in this situation is that lingual change happens in accordance with the Tsova-Tushian people's wish, because having Georgian self-identity and the ability to understand both languages (Georgian and Tsova-Tushian) as their mother tongues, it is not difficult for them to forget a language that seems to have run out of all its resources. The report contains this task and some more issues.

Georgian Christian Terms in the Caucasus**

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Since the Middle Ages Georgian was one of the basic disseminators in the Caucasian region. Christian terms that entered many Caucasian languages from Georgian confirm this fact.

The Georgian name of one Christian symbol 'cross' *žvar-i* // < *žwar-i* is established through certain phonetic changes in the Caucasian languages. To this point the following are noteworthy: Abkhazian *ažar*, Abaza *žwar*, Adyghian *žor*, Kabardian *žor*, Chechen *žōāra*, Ingush *žōarg*, Bats *žor*, Ossetian *žwar*, Karachian-Balkarian *žor*...

The Georgian name of 'cross' is entered in the composition of composites and phraseological units. Abkhazian *ažarsax̃a* 'cross-like', 'a shape of a cross', *ažar q'apš* 'a red cross', Kabardian *žor s'ən* 'to cross oneself', Chechen *žōārje djerzwo* 'christening', Ossetian *žwareverd* 'crossed'...

žor // *žor* occur in the toponymy of the Circassian languages.

Some other Christian terms entered through Georgian or from Georgian: Abkhazian *aber* 'monk', the names of 'Friday' and 'Saturday' in the Circassian languages, Kabardian *čərjəstan* 'Christian', *marx^oǎ* 'Lent' (Mozdokian dialect), Bats *monatla* 'Christening', Ossetian *kiriste* 'Christ', *natlia* 'godparent', *beri* 'monk'...

Semantica of deixis pronouns in Daghestanian languages (on the material of the Tabasaran, Agul, Rutul and Tsakhur languages)

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Demonstrative pronouns expressing various deixis semas, which characterize the spatial position of object in relation to the speaker may be found in Daghestanian languages. They are independent lexemes and not affixes, so that according to the principles of allocation of syntactic contexts and definition of categorical status they are related to the morphological and syntactic category. The opposition of two systems of orientation is to be found out in the languages: the degree of affinity with the indication of distance and the degree of remoteness, focused on the participants of the speech act.

TL <i>m-u</i>	<i>t-mu</i>
AL <i>m-e</i>	<i>t-e</i>
TsL <i>m-an (a) in-(a)</i>	
RL <i>m-i</i>	<i>t-i</i>

M-series – the object is in the sphere of the speaker (in several steps) or the speaker estimates the distance between himself / herself and the object (as smaller or equal)

than the distance between himself / herself and the object. T-series enters into the sphere of action of the addressee (the speaker estimates much wider than his/her own) or the speaker estimates the distance between the addressee and the object as lesser than the distance between himself / herself and the object. M-series is used when the speaker chooses egocentric strategy of the utterance with the object being in its sphere. The use of M-series demonstrative pronoun in the second case is impossible, as the speaker is at a slightly greater distance from the addressee, and the object is close to the addressee, the object not being in the sphere of the speaker's action.

Series H is used to indicate the remoteness of the object from the speaker and the addressee, H (1) being closer to the addressee, but farther from the speaker and the action being included into the sphere of the speaker's action. H-series (2) is farther from the addressee, farther from the speaker, but the object is in the sphere of the addressee's action. In H-series (3) the object is farther from the participants of speech act, and does not include into the sphere the action of the speech act participant. Demonstrative pronouns in the Tabasaran and Agul languages are represented implicitly: they suppose the indication of the object in two-dimensional space. In the Rutul and Tsakhur languages demonstrative pronouns are located in one-dimensional space.

<i>h-series</i>	<i>at one level</i>	<i>above</i>	<i>still above-further</i>	<i>below</i>	<i>even below</i>
TL far (1)	h-amu	ğumu	hağmu	ķumu	haķmu
far (2)	h-atmu				
very far (3)	h-admu				
AL far (1)	h-ame	le	hale	ge	hage
far (2)	h-ate				
very far (3)	ta-h-a				
ZL far (1)	h-amana				
far (2)	h-aina				
very far (3)	šena				
far and invisible	h-ošena				
RL far (1)	h-a				
far (2)	h-eme				
very far (3)	h-eti				

The zone of closeness in the investigated languages is represented by two demonstrative pronouns. Concerning the quantitative relations we observe the parity of demonstrative pronouns showing the zone of closeness. The zone of remoteness is marked in terms of growing removal from the space check point.

The Role of Language in the Loss of Culture of Immigrants. The Chechen Example

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A language is spoken by the members of a society that has its own culture. The class, the sex and the status of the speaker will influence the way he/she speaks. The way we use language affects and is affected by culture.

When the language is examined, there are two possible results. The first one is, if the language of the migrated-to place is different from the language of the immigrants, there is a necessity to learn the new language, so the new culture. The second one is, the loss or inactive use of language for adaptation and existence in the fields of education, work, and social life.

Chechens is one of the Circassian societies that live in the North Caucasus. After Caucasian-Russian wars ended in 1864, some of Chechens migrated to the Ottoman Empire. Most of these families were settled in some regions in Anatolia (Cardak is one of them) and in some countries like Jordan and Syria, by the empire.

Cardak is in Kahramanmaraş in the Mediterranean region. Today Chechens densely populate (with about 2500 people) this town. This group has 150 years of history in Turkey, with the 6th and 7th generation alive now. The ones living here have managed to keep their language and culture. But the migration to the city (for education and for other reasons), which started in 1960s, has prevented the teaching of the language to the younger generations.

It is obvious that language is the most important part of culture. Language is the basic component that transmits moral and material elements to other generations and so it provides their continuity. For this reason, Chechens, especially the younger generations, have lost and will lose their language.

In this paper, we are going to share the research data about language and relations with the Caucasus. During the field research, we stayed in the town twice. Interviews were done with 187 household heads and households, by using half-structured questionnaire forms. Also an ethnological documentary film has been shot.

Some of the research data are; 40 percent of the household heads that live in Cardak are from the 2nd generation born in Turkey, and 50 percent of them from the 3rd generation. The number of the 1st generation is only five. The all know their language and communicate with each other by using it. But it is observed that younger generations in the town, do not know the language and as a result they can not understand their cultural values and follow them. From their point of view, Turkish, which they have been using since they were children, is their native language. So they do not feel the urge to learn Chechen as a necessity. Especially since the 1990s, some relations have been established with the Caucasus. Moreover some Chechens (though not many) migrated from their town and settled there. Today most Chechens who live in Cardak think of Turkey as their homeland.

Globalization and Language Problems (The Case of the Georgian Language)

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Politics and science are active in regulating the processes of globalization, which to a certain degree used to be self-regulating, and thereby take great responsibility for the results and simultaneously make people responsible for such results, as the natural and objective course of history is already broken.

Based on the level of his or her own knowledge on a concrete question and at the same time understanding the universal changeability of attitudes and accessible information, a person can no longer stop “the globalization machine” and tries to keep up somehow with the given process, correcting his or her own miscalculations in forecasting extra-linguistic phenomena. In particular this applies to language policy and language planning when a person often makes mistakes and willy-nilly provokes language shifts and changes, which at times may almost lead to political and military conflicts.

The Georgian language, with its centuries-old history, has passed different periods of globalization and has got a wide experience of survival and cultural self-preservation. Nevertheless, we now witness a much more complex and unprecedented activity of global processes which, owing to technological promotion and information facilities without boundaries, make the public search for ways to adaptation and find general values worldwide. On the other hand, the goal is to keep the individual and all the most valuable features preserved for many long years during the course of history.

Presently a special value is given by the centuries-old experience collected by mankind, transforming different globalization stages such as: global social-economic formations, global religious processes (spread of Christianity, Islam...), global cultural processes (the European romanticism, realism, fashion), global wars (World War I, World War II, the Cold War), global state formations (the Colonial countries, USA, Soviet Union), etc. This experience has showed that different ideas, tendencies and knowledge extend globally; however, the most valuable and significant decision of those or other global processes is when they develop on the basis of spiritual and personal-national values.

From the point of view of globalization tendencies, the modern Georgian language faces a set of problems which need to be solved, including the following primary ones:

1. Searching for new recommendations, the political and general educational structures should solve problems within intercultural integration, in order to overcome language difficulties which have arisen due to linguistic differences,
2. Defining and explaining those morally-ethic foundations and values which are transferred by language through linguistic means (calques, loans, interference, etc.) which first of all are necessary for the preservation of language and ethnocultural integrity of the state. It is promoted actively by factors such as a nation-wide language, collective identity, general educational system, mass media, etc.

3. Language played an important role in accepting and understanding the ethnocultural originality of members of a society and the optimization of those stable aspects of collective consciousness tried by history for many centuries helped people to remain an integral part of a common state.

4. It is necessary to study and take into account global migration tendencies of the modern world and language complexities during integration of migrants (permanent or temporary) in a new society. This issue is closely connected to such language phenomena, as bilingualism, multilingualism, intermediate languages, diglossia, language conflicts, language legislation, language socialization, education in modern languages, and problems of translation, including machine translation, etc.

Code Mixing and Language Interference: The speech of Georgian Immigrants in Italy. A Case study

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Since the 1990s of the last century, the augmenting emigration from the Post Soviet area into the countries of Europe brought about a formation of contact-induced linguistic phenomena in the languages of the Immigrant communities, caused by the interference between the L1 of Immigrants and the main language of the host country.

The paper deals with a case study, illustrating the contact-induced phenomena emerging in the speech of Georgian immigrants in Italy. Particular attention will be paid to the intrasentential code-mixing, in the sense of Bhatia & Ritchie (2005): ‘Code-mixing’ (CM) refers to the mixing of various linguistic units (morphemes, words, modifiers, phrases, clauses, and sentences) from two participating grammatical systems within a sentence. CM is intrasentential and is constrained by grammatical principles and motivated by socio-psychological motivations’.

Some examples from the casual speech of Georgian immigrants (see below) will be analyzed, with focus on various patterns of morphological embedding of Italian words in Georgian as matrix language.

Types of embedded words/expressions. *Direct embedding*:

1. *p’ulici-eb-s ak’etebs*
pulizia-PL-DAT do:PRS:3SUB
She cleans/tidies up (from Italian fixed expression fare le pulizie (**plural**) c
Georgian *a-lag-eb-s* PV-tidy up-PRS-3SUB).

Partial embedding: Italian root with Georgian inflectional suffixes:

2. *da-t'rank'vil-d-i*

PV-tranquillo (quiet)-PASS-AOR

Be quiet (from Italian tranquillo 'quiet')

cfr. Georgian *da-c'q'nar-d-i* PV-quiet-PASS-AOR –
from *c'q'nari* 'quiet')

Interjection borrowing:

3. *-dges ra dgea?*

-Which day is today?

bo!

I don't know

(from Italian *boh* - an interjection expressing doubt or indecision)

Sociolinguistic factors determining the code-mixing will also be singled out, addressing the issue of whether the code-mixing is a random phenomenon and to what extent it depends on the competence level in Italian of the persons affected by code-mixing.

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Caucasian languages and language contact in terms of religions

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From a historical view point, one of the most striking features in the Caucasian languages is the preservation of archaic linguistic structures, often represented by the active alignment. These languages might have had contact with non-Caucasian languages, but the contact-induced changes may not be as obvious as those in other languages in Europe. In this paper, it is argued that the preservation of older linguistic structure is somehow related to religion, or more precisely, religious reformation. The majority of IE languages have changed dramatically after the Renaissance period and Church reformation. The Orthodox and Sunni Muslims are the two main religions in the Caucasus region, but they have not gone through a major reformation as in the Catholic and Protestant Churches. This can be a reason for the current status of the Caucasian languages.

Lexic expressing migration in the country, and some problems of language identity in modern Georgia

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In Georgian historical sources and in documentation we meet special terminology, which by influence of the military situation express the nature of the population's migration and social status. Part of this terminology is used in modern Georgian, but today's terminology conveys not only the condition of the migrants, but their social establishment. Because admitting a person (or persons) into this or that category will define his future life style, it will give him a definite public assistance. Hence, the social self-respect of the person is moving back and most important is receiving support. So, the more humble the person, the higher the support.

In the Georgian language, lexical items expressing the migration of population have changed semantically and connotatively from ancient times. In our report we discuss the hierarchy of lexic expressing nature and status of migration. We can group these lexical items so:

- a. Vocabulary which expresses reasons for leaving place of living (*lt'olvili, devnili, izulebit gadaadgilebuli p'iri, gakceuli, xizani* and other);
- b. Vocabulary which expresses result of leaving place of living (*miusapari, usaxlk'aro, uluk'map'uro, šemc'eobis gareše, darčenili...*);
- c. Vocabulary which expresses emigrant's nature of adaptation (*šesaxlda, časaxlda, šeič'ra, šeexizna, šeepara...*);
- d. Vocabulary which expresses disposition of people whose area moved into, towards migrant people (*šeec'ia, daexmara, šeexida, uc'ilada, dauriga, moc'q'aleba gaiyo, gulumoc'q'aleba gamoičina, kvelmokmedeba gasc'ia...*);

We must remark, that society is divided in several parts: (1) Who is helping (*šemc'eobs, xeli gauc'oda, mxarši amoudga, moc'q'aleba gaiyo, šeipara, misca/gadasca, kvelmokmedobs, mecenat'obs, mparvelobs* and etc.); (2) They in whose area migrants moved in; (3) Who are helping; (4) Who moved in someone's apartment.

People's mood; those who are persecuted in their own country reflect badly on society's unity. Refugees, whose number since 1992 year is only increasing, feel psychological divarication.

Language is trying to find such words, that will soften the situation, that will be neutral, but spontaneous diplomacy is more and more unsuccessful. People whose area has been moved into by refugees feel that refugees, ho once were guests, are now a heavy load; where problems are not solved. refugees don't feel as if they are at home, so there is a rift in civil society.

Section 6: Migration, labor and civil society

Discrimination of ethnic minorities in the field of labour**

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One of the most important problems in Georgia today is unemployment: these problems refer mostly to the ethnic minorities, as often in Georgia the ethnic origin of the candidate is taken into consideration, along with many other requirements, when recruiting new employees. Research analysis into problems of inequality and discrimination against ethnic minorities (Armenians and Azerbaijanis) in the sphere of labour reveals the conditions of society discourse and discourse of the ethnic minorities themselves in the spheres of discussion of ethnic problems and employment in Georgian society.

The analyses of the study carried out reveals that ethnic consciousness is determined by cultural customs and ideology characterising and distinguishing Azerbaijanis and Armenians. Members of these ethnic groups consider themselves culturally different from Georgians, - and Georgians think the same about them. Ethnic identity being a part of social identity in Georgian multiethnic society, Georgians maintain group identity: they are prejudiced against representatives of other ethnic groups and avoid close interaction with them. Inequalities of this kind and discrimination against ethnic minorities involve 'establishment of barriers' in the process of which ethnic minorities maintain borders, isolating them from others. In these circumstances the emergence of barriers in Georgia is combined with redistribution of resources, in other words, with inequality in the distribution of wealth and material welfare, which is reflected in the involvement (or non-involvement) of ethnic minorities in the sphere of labour.

Migration trends in Georgia since 1995

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The research paper examines migration trends since 1995, potential future migration and public attitudes. It reviews existing literature to provide an overview of migration trends in Georgia since its independence, with particular focus on the post-1995 period. It also examines popular destination countries, particularly the shift to European Union countries. It assesses the experiences and needs of returnees, labour as well as highly-skilled. After reviewing the limited literature on returnees, current small scale return and reintegration efforts are outlined. Finally, conclusions and recommendations are offered.

Migration, both forced and voluntary, has shaped modern day Georgia. Best estimates are that Georgia has lost at least 20% of its 1989 population to migration, and now hosts

an aging population with a high level of “brain drain” and low birth rates. In fact, Georgia experienced one of the highest rates of out migration in the world between 1995 and 2000, and was ranked ninth in the world in 2003 and all experts expect this pace to continue in the near future.

Unemployment, insufficient income and harsh socio-economic conditions are key drivers of Georgia’s labour flows. Since 1995, an increasing number of Georgian citizens have adopted economic (or labour) migration as a household survival strategy; the best available data estimates that 6-10% of households have at least one member who has migrated abroad for work, with some fluctuation regionally. Those who migrate tend to be highly educated, married and of working age. Women have increasingly joined men in the migration flows, with each gender favouring different countries. In this century Europe, rather than Russia, has become an increasingly popular destination for labour migrants, in part due to higher remuneration and lifestyle preference.

In addition to labour migration, Georgia is experiencing anecdotally high rates of both highly-skilled and educational migration. While many of the elites and most skilled fled after the collapse, the limited skilled job market in Georgia has prompted many of the young to leave for jobs or career advancement. Others who obtain education abroad often end up travelling abroad again in search of work. Germany and the United Kingdom are popular destinations for educational migrants.

These migration patterns have significantly impacted Georgia demographically and economically. Demographers concur that Georgia is in a demographic crunch, with an aging population and too few working age citizens. This situation is exacerbated by both the loss of highly-skilled Georgians and their underutilization during migration. Remittances, however, have been vital to the economic livelihood of many Georgians, with remittances officially constituting 6.5% of GDP in 2005. In recent years, the diaspora abroad has also become increasingly engaged.

As long as the economic situation remains difficult, sustainable return remains a challenge.

The improved economic outlook for Georgia has neither mitigated the outflows of migrants nor promoted the sustainable return of any class of migrants. Labour migrants who return have a high potential for re-migration due to the lack of viable employment. Few find improved employment or incomes upon return, according to the data that has been collected. Highly-skilled returnees with work experience tend to have returned for particular opportunities offered to them. There is, as of now, no evidence of a surge of attractive positions becoming available to such highly-skilled returnees.

Institute of Elections in Transitional Societies: Case of Kazakhstan and Armenia**

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The author was a long-term observer of the OSCE/ODIHR Election Observation Mission on the Presidential Election of 2008 in the Republic of Armenia. Participation in this Mission has shown that problems of transitional post-Soviet political systems are common in many respects, despite the will to conduct elections according to obligations and standards of the OSCE and the Council of Europe.

Comparing the presidential elections of 2008 in Armenia and the presidential elections in Kazakhstan (December, 2005) it is necessary to note distinctions. The pre-election situation in Armenia developed extremely dynamically, and it was very difficult to predict who would be the winner and how many rounds would be required. Nine candidates competed for a post of the head of state. Both Serzh Sarkisyan and Levon Ter-Petrosian's supporters were absolutely convinced of a victory for their candidate in the first round. According to the Central Electoral Committee of Armenia, Serzh Sarkisyan received 52.86% votes, Levon Ter-Petrosian – 21.5% votes, and the leader of opposition party Arthur Bagdasaryan – 11.6 %. The other six candidates received less than 10% of the votes.

In the most recent presidential elections in Kazakhstan (December 4, 2005) four applicants were involved in the race, however the leader was obvious. The incumbent president Nursultan Nazarbaev received 91.15% of the vote. The president got votes from across the political spectrum - from right to left. Practically all sectors of the population showed their support for him. Even protestors and the passive electorate voted for him in response to the threat of loss of stability.

On 20 February, the International Election Observation Mission (IEOM) issued a joint Statement of Preliminary Findings and Conclusions. This statement reported that the 19 February presidential election “was administered mostly in line with OSCE and Council of Europe commitments and standards. The high-State authorities made genuine efforts to address shortcomings noted in previous elections, including the legal framework, and repeatedly stated their intention to conduct democratic elections. However, further improvements are required to address remaining challenges such as: the absence of a clear separation between State and party functions, the lack of public confidence in the electoral process and ensuring equal treatment of election contestants. The conduct of the count did not contribute to reducing an existing suspicion amongst election stakeholders.”

A similar assessment is contained in the OSCE/ODIHR Final report on the presidential elections in Kazakhstan.

Modern transitologists more often speak about the less important role of mass in present political transformations, representatives of elite being the major subject of political process. The analysis of post-authoritative transitions in the CIS countries demonstrates that the decision-making of elites is the crucial factor. Formal political institutions of democracy have been accelerated less than for 10 years, but not supported by

corresponding mass models of behavior. Therefore the important problem is overcoming any break between new institutions and old models of mass behavior.

“Temporary life” of labor seasonal migrants from Western Mountain Dagestan to Rostov area: cultural projection or cultural transformation

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The article deals with labor migration of rural population from Western Highland Dagestan (Tsumadinsky, Tsuntinsky areas), where there are many Muslim ethnical minorities incorporated into the Avar nation in the 1950s. The hard economical situation and high level of unemployment make a considerable part of the population of this area to move for the summer season to grow vegetables in the plains of Southern Russia (Rostov area with prevalent Russian population). As usual Dagestanians join into working groups, *brigades*, that consist of families who rent 1-10 hectares and work on it. They live in temporary houses right in the fields. Thus, during the whole summer season there are temporary villages of Dagestanians.

These people live almost half a year in a place which is quite different from their own, close to other ethnic groups with other cultural, social and religious experience (Russians, Ukrainians, etc). Thus, evidently there has been a process of cultural transformation inside the temporary settlements of labor migrants from Western Highland Dagestan: is this a copy of “traditional” Dagestanian life or something new?

Rules of land tenure. Traditionally these societies used to be agricultural. Now the most fields in the mountains are no more in use; people prefer to use lands for animal husbandry – actually agricultural practice has gone to the Rostov area. Indeed some elements of traditional Dagestanian agricultural system are in use in this new business (*meg* as synthesis of private and collective land property, communal helping *gwy*, *movlid* as an occasional rite for the rain, etc). But village lands in Dagestan are still supposed to be symbolically valuable and for each member of the rural society it is very important to have his own lands, even he doesn’t use them any more, rented lands are perceived only in a utilized way.

Gender roles. In Highland Dagestan all manual agricultural works are women’s works and are considered to be very disgraceful for men. At the fields of Rostov area men often work with their wives and children, which is still almost impossible in a modern Dagestanian village.

Religious situation, traditional customs. In these villages there has being an active process of reislamisation: new religious leaders who studied in Arabic countries forbid some traditional customs which in their opinion contradict Islam. But in the Rostov area the influence of these leaders decreases and the migrants are allowed to return to some traditional customs which are now prohibited at home (game “marriage”, bad words for women, dances, etc). It is interesting to note that almost all norms of *shariat* are held.

Social relationship. Traditionally highland houses were built very close to each other. Furthermore, the village is organized into some districts with strong neighbor relationships. Now new houses are built at a distance from each other and are surrounded by gardens. In such a situation neighbor connections become less intensive. Working in the fields and living close to each other at the temporary settlements renew these connections and there are such social contacts (meeting of young people, team-work of women, etc) which have almost disappeared now in the villages.

Rights of Azerbaijani Labor Migrants in Russia: Problems and Search of Ways of Their Solution

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During the Soviet period high birth rate and surplus of labor force in Azerbaijan were main causes of migration of Azerbaijanis to Russia and other Soviet republics. In the post- soviet period due to visible worsening of socio- economic situations which in its turn was caused by involuntarily involvement of Azerbaijan by Armenia into conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh the migration of Azerbaijanis to Russia was essentially increased. According to the official statistics of Azerbaijan since 1993 a number of Azerbaijanis leaving the country for permanent residence in Russia has been constantly rising. A significant number among country leavers are labor migrants.

Azerbaijani labor migrants do not have permanent residence in Russia. Even some of them do not have a work permit. There is no exact statistics on their number. According to the unofficial statistics there are about 1.5 million Azerbaijani labor migrants in Russia. They have been working mostly in trade sector. It should be noted that their earnings are the main source for supporting their family in Azerbaijan. Annually they send about 1 billion USD to their families.

Since the beginning of the 1990's Azerbaijani labor migrants have been systematically exposed to discrimination and violence by some policemen and members of various informal fascist organizations (skinheads). According to Azerbaijan News Service private TV channel, in 2006 above 1000 Azerbaijanis residing in Russia were subjected to violence. As a result 130 of them were killed and 489 were seriously injured. It should be noted these illegal acts toward Azerbaijani labor migrants have become threatening character. The following scenario is very widely used by policemen. Under the pretext of checking the passport regime policemen raid into office, shops of Azerbaijani labor migrants and forcibly take away their property, money, and beat them.

The discrimination and violence toward Azerbaijani labor migrants in Russia has had negative consequences also for Russia itself. These consequences have political, socio-economic and moral dimensions. The given situation is nothing but a crude violation of human rights, which has a negative impact on the Russia's image in international relations. Historically Azerbaijanis have been involved in economic and trade activities. It is not accidentally that there are many Azerbaijanis entrepreneurs in

Russia. Some of them have been doing a charitable work. The discrimination and violence toward Azerbaijani labor migrants in Russia give a rise to spreading anti-Azerbaijanis moods among Russians.

Thus, there is a problem of violation of elementary rights of Azerbaijani labor migrants in Russia which have various negative consequences. In such a situation there is an urgent need in analysis of causes of violation of elementary rights of Azerbaijani labor migrants in Russia and in elaboration of practical recommendations for preventing the violation of these rights.