



COMMUNICATION: A MEANS TO IMPROVE THE IMPLEMENTATION OF DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMMES

A field study in Topola, Serbia

Ulla Engberg*



When it started, with up to 50 people a day queuing outside its offices hoping for something it did not provide, the Topola Rural Development Programme (TRDP), in the town of Topola, Serbia, faced real difficulties in getting through to people regarding what it was about: TRDP did not have a communication strategy. This article looks at how this influenced its implementation, revealing the choices the programme did make in terms of communication, and how that corresponded with the needs of the local community.

Despite a growing understanding of communication for development, there is a lot of uncertainty about how to go about it in reality. According to Fraser and Restrepo-Estrada: “Even though communication for development came into being in the 1960s, and has clearly shown its usefulness and impact in change and development actions, its role is still not understood and appreciated to the point that it is routinely included in development planning” [1].

In 2002, the Swedish International Development Agency (Sida) adopted a new communication strategy, which states that communication at programme level is “a tool to create participation, to achieve objectives and to contribute to dialogue and good quality” [2].

This study of the experiences of the Topola Rural Development Programme (TRDP) was an attempt to find out what that means in reality. It was conducted during two months in the summer of 2004, when I made over 40 interviews with staff and members of the local community. Sida commissioned a report on its findings.

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BACKGROUND AND CONTEXT

The Programme

Set up in the small town of Topola, Serbia [3], the overall objective of the TRDP was to “improve the quality of life for the communities living in the municipality” [4]. Envisioned as a participatory programme, it aimed to facilitate projects “responding to the initiatives and active participation of the stakeholders” [5]. A project run by, for example, a local action group in a village, an NGO, a group of entrepreneurs or the municipality could get support from the Programme, either financially or through training and study tours.

The Programme was carried out through three sub-sections or “facilities” run by “facilitators”: a Community Facility focused on civil society development, a Municipal Facility concentrating on reform of the local authorities, and an Economic Facility working to develop the agriculture and business sectors.

The Programme was funded by Sida and implemented by Opto International from March 2002 to February 2005. The overall budget was 45,3 million SEK.

Context

When the TRDP came to Serbia in early 2002, one and a half years had passed since Slobodan Milosevic had accepted his defeat in democratic elections. His 13 years in power had been characterised by wars, sanctions and a stifling political climate where the freedom of the press was severely limited. With Milosevic removed and sanctions lifted, many international agencies returned with the aim of helping the country to reverse the increasing impoverishment and become a stabile parliamentary democracy and functioning market economy.

Among those returning was Sida. TRDP was its first big programme in Serbia, and the organisation had high hopes for it: “If the project is successful, it could be the pilot-project for other similar activities in the rest of the county” [6].

When I asked people in Topola about the TRDP’s communication, they mentioned four factors to explain the context the Programme came into.

People were not used to taking initiatives. For over 50 years, they had lived in a system where virtually all initiatives came from above. One interviewee called the government in the communist system “a present-giving agency”. He said: “A party official would come to a community and

say 'ok, people, what do you need?', and the people would list their needs and get something". When the TRDP arrived, it followed in the footsteps of other outsiders who had come to hand out 'gifts' in an arbitrary fashion.

People were used to credits. In Yugoslavia it was common to receive credits for private needs: to buy a car, to build a house, etc. Credits were also given to businesses but no business plan was required. Conditions were very favourable and, for long periods, inflation was so high that credits virtually became donations. Therefore, when people heard about an organisation arriving to improve their quality of life, they immediately thought of credits.

People felt they had a right to receive help. When Milosevic was toppled in October 2000, many Serbs were relieved. They felt they had been victims of their former president, of war and of sanctions. Now, finally, their suffering would be over. A path to a better life was ahead. There was a widespread assumption that the outside world would help them catch up, almost as if it was 'owed' to them. "We felt we deserved it, after all we had been through", said one interviewee.

People were suspicious of foreign NGOs and the NGO sector due to decades of propaganda. 'Non-governmental' was interpreted as 'anti-governmental' and subsequently understood as 'traitors' and 'spies'. This fitted well with the fact that most NGOs at the time were financed mainly by foreign money. A study commissioned by TRDP in the summer of 2002 confirmed this perception: many said they thought the Programme was "manipulating people" (i.e. its stated goals were other than the real goals) [7].

A fifth factor, specific of Topola, was also significant for the communication between the Programme and the community.

Limited local media. Apart from one commercial radio station, which mainly plays folk music, there is no local media in Topola. Also, there is no regular reporting from there by regional and national printing and broadcasting media.

These factors shaped people's expectations of and attitudes towards the Programme.

Before arrival

The TRDP did not have a communication strategy from the beginning. However, in the eyes of the local community, communication with and about the Programme started even before it had set up office in Topola. Rumours started when a consultant arrived in the spring of 2001 to research the basis for a rural development programme. In the proposal document she estimated that a budget of 70 million SEK would be suitable for a three-year programme [8]. This figure later reoccurred in the terms of reference of the Programme in January 2002. According to an assessment paper at the time, this was a “tentative budget” and “it has been stressed during the discussions with the Topola representatives, as well as with the Consultant, that those figures were tentatively indicative and do not have face value” [9].

The “Topola representatives” (the Mayor and the Head of the Municipal Council) travelled to Stockholm in January 2002 for the interviews with potential implementers of the Programme. When they returned to Topola they called a press conference to announce the good news. Many of my interviewees, including journalists present at the time, talked about what they remember from that press conference and the following live radio show. All accounts corroborate the story of how the politicians boasted about a Swedish organisation coming to invest 70 million SEK (7 million euro) in Topola. Nothing was said about the conditions attached to this money, nor that salaries, rent and implementation costs were included in the sum.

Word got around and soon everybody in Topola knew that ‘the Swedes’ were coming with a lot of money. According to Opto, the programme implementers, the local politicians initially had an attitude of “where is our money?”.

TRDP comes to town

A week or so after TRDP arrived in town, a public meeting/press conference was held in the local cinema. It was a big event that attracted a lot of interest, with a guest list including the Swedish Ambassador to Belgrade and the Serbian Crown Prince and Princess Karadjordjevic. Accounts as to what was said at the meeting differ slightly, but all mention mixed messages, confusion, high expectations and disappointment.

From day one, the TRDP offices were under siege from people asking for ‘their’ share of the money. Up to 50 people a day queued up outside. With few exceptions, they all wanted credits: to buy a cow, to buy machinery for

their business, even to build a Swedish-Serb cultural village.

Since the TRDP was designed to “respond to the initiatives” of the locals, closing the doors to these visitors was never seen as an option. Attempts to regulate opening hours for visitors were soon abandoned, as impossible to stick to. People would stop staff in any event, whether in the corridors of their office, in the streets, in the shops, etcetera.

Facilitators sat down with each individual and listened to their story, trying to explain what it meant to be a development programme and what kind of initiatives it could support, while simultaneously trying to see if there were any potential projects or initiatives to encourage and build on. In the evenings they would go to villages, to local companies and interest groups, to schools and other public sector workplaces, in order to introduce themselves and the Programme, to counter rumours and to encourage people to form initiatives that could be supported.

Looking back, the staff saw a need for more training and support in order to deal with inquiries. “Sometimes, we felt like psychologists”, said one staff member, “listening to people’s life stories and sometimes very difficult stories. Women sat here crying almost every day, showing us pictures of their family and so on”. In addition, both staff and management called for clearer direction from Sida as to how to practically interpret its ‘pillars’. They felt unsure about the rules regarding what they could and could not support, which made it more difficult to be straight in their own communication with people in the community.

This lack of clarity was reflected in an interview with one person who visited the TRDP office in the beginning to ask for credits. “When I left their offices, I was confused,” he says. “I had understood only two things. One was that they did not give credits, the other was that they did not really know what they could support”.

THE INFORMATION AND PROGRAMME AWARENESS PROJECT

At the end of the inception period, three months into the Programme, there were still lines of people outside the TRDP offices. As a matter of urgency, an ‘Information and Programme Awareness Project’ (henceforth the Information Project) was designed, in order to try to counter misunderstandings and get on top of the communication with the community. The main components of this project were:

- A local PR-assistant.

- An Information Centre set up jointly with the Municipality.
- Advertisement in regional radio stations and press coverage in the national media explaining the concept and the goal of the Programme.
- A leaflet about the Programme delivered to all households.
- 32 notice boards at strategic points in villages and the Topola town centre, divided into three sections: one for the public, one for the Municipality and one for the TRDP. Here, the Programme advertised things coming up and achievements made, updating it fortnightly.
- A 20-page monthly magazine made by the Information Centre and distributed for free via kiosks and shops in Topola and surrounding villages.

The PR-assistant managed to raise the Programme's profile in the media. He co-ordinated the information that went on the notice boards and was the Information Centre's driving force.

However, as time went by, it became increasingly clear that the Information Centre did not work as the Programme had hoped. The Municipality's staff did not feel they had the support they needed from their political bosses to carry out their new job on top of their old duties. "I want him [the Head of the Municipal council] to look me in the eye and say what we can and cannot write", said one of them about the monthly magazine. Expressing a fear shared by his colleagues, he noted: "I will not write something that will make me loose my job". Tensions soon proved too much for the monthly magazine, which closed down after four issues. The emergence of a new law, forbidding municipalities to run newspapers, radio or TV stations, was only the final nail in the coffin for an already troubled initiative.

Nor did the Information Centre take off as a place for people to find out more about the Programme. Visitors were not satisfied with the information they received there and still wanted to speak to the facilitators or the Programme manager.

By the end of Phase 1, halfway through the Programme's three years, the Information Centre existed in name only. TRDP decided to withdraw its PR-assistant from it to work solely for the Programme. The notice boards lived on, but the TRDP was almost alone in using them. The Municipality never used them, due to a lack of interest or resources (depending on whom you ask). The public used them mainly as a way of announcing the death of a relative.

The demise of the Information Project did not mean that communication between the Programme and the community did not take place. In order to find out how it worked, my interviews with TRDP staff and members of the local community focused on the channels of communication. How did people in Topola find out about the Programme? Where did they get their information from? Which information did they trust? Did they feel they could approach the Programme? And, if so, how did they do that?

Informal channels

The most common way for people to hear what was going on in the Programme was through neighbours or friends they met as they went about their daily business. Rumours were of course a factor, but generally there seem to have been a strong urge to take a step further and find out more. All interviewees emphasised the importance of the low-key, informal conversations taking place in the cafés and on the street.

When asked about the propensity to prefer informal channels, several interviewees said: “well, that is how we are, we people from the Balkans”. Others painted a broader picture, like this businessman from town: “There is another thing as well: the wars. Yes, I don’t know all the wars that happened to us. People were mobilised and sent to war, and still the country, Serbia, was not in war. Lies, lies, lies. And of course a certain number of people lost their faith in everything. The only thing you trust is yourself. This means, you do not trust the state, not your business colleagues, not the bank, no-one, no-one, no-one. There is no trust for anybody”.

Face-to-face communication

In any case, people tended to prefer face-to-face contacts. Local staff was high on the list of channels. And when people said local, they meant from Topola. Staff from Belgrade might as well be from Sweden: they were not “from here”. Fieldworkers were often told “you are from here, you would not lie to us”, meaning they would still be around after the Programme had left, so people could hold them personally accountable to promises made. Likewise, local drivers and secretaries became an important information node for their neighbours and friends, whether they wanted to or not.

In the villages, TRDP was often personified by the fieldworkers. In one

interview a retired woman from a village did not understand when I asked her whether she remembered the first time she had heard about Opto. She thought I meant the local radio station, Optop. When I explained that I was talking about the organisation often referred to as 'the Swedes', she immediately said "Ooh, you mean the organisation that Ivanka is in?!".

Fieldworkers were also key receivers of information: "In some villages they just tell us what is bad, what is happening, what is good, what they feel about this and about that. It does not matter if we have answer or don't have answer (...) they want to tell us and that is it," said one fieldworker from Topola.

One-to-one communication with people in the TRDP office was also highly rated. Many people who contacted the Programme stressed the importance of the openness of the staff and their ability to listen: "They would always answer the phone when you called. I found that very good", said one businesswoman from town.

While the staff at times found it hard to cope with the line of people outside their offices, it also achieved some results. Some of those who stood in line, hoping for credits, turned out to be those key individuals prepared to act as the driving forces for change. In the community, the communication often went via these people: "There are key people in a community and they are not always the ones that on the surface are important. In a project I worked in Peru it was a storeowner, where people used to buy food and talk to her –the whole community got to hear it", said one international member of staff.

The importance of language

The Community Facility was set up around a series of workshops where people would formulate, design and implement small 'projects'. Workshops were a space for the Programme to explain a more complex message while simultaneously allowing people to ask questions and provide feedback. Some were specifically dedicated to participatory evaluation.

The Programme also made several public presentations, among others to present results in the form of progress reports, where people could come and listen and ask questions. Those who came were already relatively well-informed about the Programme. "It was always the same faces," said one member of staff.

Several interviewees mentioned the importance of using a language that

suits the audience. Anglicisms and 'development-speak' can be off-putting for people in the community. "When you go to a village and say 'strategic planning' says one field worker and laughs "they don't understand what you say. (...) [You cannot] expect people to understand everything you say. You must think [of the right] approach to... for that people."

An international staff member noted: "It is so easy that, when you talk to others, who do not really know what you do, you talk about 'capacity building' and you talk about 'implementation', all that jargon and those clichés that you use without noticing. (...) You think you know what you mean, because people around you use the same words. But if you can't explain in your own language what it means, then perhaps you have not really understood it".

Language was also brought up in connection to the material published in leaflets and on notice boards. One office worker in his mid 30-ies, from a village, said: "In the beginning, the information that went on the notice boards was... It made me feel stupid. It was written in a way that I did not understand what they were talking about".

Mass-communication

Towards the end of the list of communication channels we find the Internet (the TRDP had a web-site, but not many in Topola have access to Internet), the leaflets (two-and-a-half years after their door-to-door delivery, no-one seemed to remember them) and the notice boards.

The notice boards were a communication channel often mentioned by the staff, while people in the community needed to be asked a direct question about them before noting them as such. It seems as if their significance differed from village to village. Possibly, the notice board placed at the main bus station was more important than others: several people mentioned that they had read things there while waiting for transportation.

Only a few people referred to hearing or reading about the Programme in the media.

Other means

While not a channel as such, one of the most important ways for the Programme to explain to the community what it was doing was concrete results, as mentioned by several interviewees. This was crucial to people in

Topola, who otherwise were quick to dismiss the Programme as 'all talk, no action'.

One woman who was among the first to join the Programme's activities was mocked by people around her in the beginning: "They asked me: 'Why is someone as old as you going to a computer course?'". When they could see a concrete result from her involvement (the setup of a textile factory, employing 50 women) they stopped laughing. "Only then would I have been able to become an 'ambassador' for the Programme," she said.

A 'lost' year

The difficulties faced in the beginning were very real. The Programme manager even talks about a "lost year" and staff members who were there from the start smile and shake their head when asked if they would be prepared to do it again.

On balance, it was positive that so many found their way to the Programme. It would have been worse if no-one turned up. Nevertheless, the fact that two-and-a-half years after the TRDP's arrival many of my interviewees said that they had only recently started understanding what the Programme was about ("and now they are leaving") indicates that there are important lessons to be learnt.

When asked about the reasons for the difficulties, interviewees tended to point to two factors: the local context into which the Programme entered; and the lack of understanding in both Sida and TRDP of the role of communication when starting it. This was also noted by the group that monitored the Programme's performance on behalf of the donor. Referring to the unrealistic expectations of the citizens of Topola, they wrote: "Against this background, Sida and the implementation consultant have made a strategic mistake in initiating programme planning and the inception phase, without first carrying out a public information campaign (...) about the scope of the Programme and the financial resources at disposal" [10].

ANALYSING THE COMMUNICATION DIFFICULTIES

Limitations of the PR-approach

There is, no doubt, a real challenge in explaining a concept of development (capacity building and strengthening of democratic

structures and processes, etc.) to a community that is expecting donations and credits.

How effective was the Information Project in addressing the problems?

Very few of my interviewees mentioned any of its components as playing a role in shaping their understanding of the TRDP. And when they did mention them, they generally rated them as having a limited importance.

Apart from the Information Centre, this effort focused exclusively on one-way, sender-to-receiver communication. The communication channels rated higher, on the other hand, were all people-centred, based on an exchange of messages. This, rather than the mass communication channels, seemed to respond to the communication needs of the people in the community.

However, the low rating of the one-way communication was probably not solely due to a lack of trust in the community. Experiences from social marketing campaigns [11] show that if this tool is used to spread new ideas, it must be sustained for a longer period. In addition, the audience must be segmented, perhaps into different 'lifestyle clusters', and well researched. "Designers of interventions need to know where potential consumers live, their routines, and relations vis-à-vis multiple messages" [12]. The information that the TRDP attached to bank statements of local businesspeople reached a relatively well-defined target group. But for most of the Programme's other one-way information, the receiver was much more unspecified and the same message was sent to all.

Indirect problems

An additional aspect of the Information Project was that there seemed to be confusion between the communication and information needs of the Programme and those of the Municipality. The TRDP had needs related to its implementation: how to get past misunderstandings, gain trust, achieve lasting results, etc. The Municipality had needs that touch on issues of democratisation, such as increased communication with its citizens, increased transparency, etc. These can be seen as part of the Programme's objectives.

By not distinguishing the two, a conflict was built into the foundations of the Information Centre. The fact that the politicians in the Municipality did not necessarily see increased communication with the community as a need was a further complicating factor.

The same dual role was given to the magazine, where a lot of energy and

time was invested. It was an ambitious product, with 20 pages full of information about not only the TRDP, but also activities in the NGO-sector, the Municipality and Topola in general. But what was its aim? To fill the media void in Topola in order to stimulate democratic debate? Or to prevent people queuing up at the TRDP offices to ask for credits? If it was the former, a much longer-term strategy and thought-through set-up of the editorial staff would have been required. If it was the latter and the Programme saw it as a format for getting out specific information that people could take home to read, a more focused newsletter would probably have constituted a better use of resources.

The case for a more systematic approach

All in all, there seems to have been a lack of analysis of both the Programme's communication needs and the conditions in which communication took place. However, as seen earlier, the Information Project only represented a part of the Programme's communication efforts. Most of the communication happened as part of the regular Programme activities, as instinctive responses to the situation, and as a result of a problem-solving attitude of the staff. This was not necessarily the most efficient way to deal with things, leaving the Programme in a reactive rather than a proactive position. A more systematic approach to communication both from Sida and the TRDP would have allowed the Programme to structure its efforts better. A strategy defined at the planning stage would have made it easier for staff to cope and would most likely have brought more people in the community on board at an earlier stage.

AN ALTERNATIVE WAY OF LOOKING AT COMMUNICATION

Different communication axes

The Programme's implementation implied different 'axes' of communication depending on who was involved at either end. In order to communicate efficiently it is essential not to mix those 'axes' up. The Programme would for example communicate with the community, the municipality and Sida along three different 'axes'. Good communication along these can be seen as a tool to improve the Programme's implementation.

There were also other communication axes: between the community and the municipality, between different parts of the community, and between the community and the rest of the world. Improving communication

between these actors relates more to Programme objectives such as empowerment, building trust and democratic structures, etc.

This distinction is relevant because communication in the first case is a tool, while in the latter it is an end in itself. Not distinguishing between the two made it virtually impossible for the Programme to evaluate how the tool could be used to improve its implementation. Instead, as in the case of the monthly magazine, communication became an end in itself, without much analysis of whether it fulfilled its purpose.

This study has focused on the communication between the Programme and the local community, which is where success ultimately will be measured.

What did the Programme want to achieve by communicating with the community?

After clarifying the different communication axes at play, the Programme would have needed to think through what it wanted to achieve through communication. Below are five possible objectives of TRDP's communication with the community. These are largely issues that the Programme was addressing, but did not necessarily think of in terms of communication.

1. Local understanding of the development approach. The Programme needed people to understand their long-term development approach and that they did not deliver any credits. It was a case of managing expectations and making people realise that the Programme would not build a factory but were ready to support the processes that might lead to a factory.

2. Increased local participation and local initiatives. As the programme manager noted: "We were supposed to support local initiatives, but when we first came, there were no initiatives. All people wanted was credits!".

One way of looking at it could be in terms of target groups of different "levels" or "circles". An inner circle represents those key individuals in the community who are/could be driving forces for change. They are normally trusted and have influence over how people around them perceive things. The next circle consists of those who are curious and interested, and who could be prepared to support the Programme and the "key individuals". They will show up at Programme presentations and will, in turn, talk to their families and neighbours about what they have heard. It is necessary for the circles not to be fixed, so that people as well as information can

move between them. The outer circle is the community as a whole. For the Programme it is vital to identify and reach out to the key individuals, while also communicating with the other circles –crucially, in different ways with different groups. In order to make it possible for more and more people to move to the “inner” circles, the Programme needs support even in the outer circles for what it is trying to do.

3. Openness –both in terms of accessibility and transparency .

Transparency refers both to the results and the methodology. It can be a pedagogical tool to explain the Programme and show that it achieves results; but also a way to be accountable to the community, encouraging a sense of local ownership. By being accessible, the Programme opens itself up to ideas and feedback from the community, which it then can build on. This kind of responsiveness would have helped the Programme to get things right –and to find out when they went wrong.

4. Knowledge acquisition & sounding board. Communication is also a way to keep the Programme up-to-date about what is going on in the community and to reconfirm that it is on the right track. A Programme that knows what people in the community are concerned with and talking about, can respond to needs better and deal with rumours quicker.

5. Life after the Programme. The TRDP wanted to differentiate itself from other international agencies that leave resentment and loose ends behind after closing down projects in a community. By creating a dialogue about the phase-out strategy while still in the implementing stages and encouraging the community's independence from the Programme, a more positive ending would have been possible. The aim must be that people do not feel deserted, but instead want to continue building on the foundations set up during the Programme.

THE TOOLS OF COMMUNICATION

If we envision communication as a tool to help with the implementation of the Programme, and we want to use this tool not just to stop people from queuing up outside our door, but to address the areas listed above - the next step is to look at the tool itself and how to use it.

One consequence of TRDP seeing communication as the narrow sender-to-receiver scenario was that some important aspects of the communication between programme and community tended to be taken for granted. In addition to putting the Programme in a reactive position rather than a proactive one (and thereby probably missing opportunities), it also left the staff feeling completely overwhelmed.

A striking result from the interviews regarding the importance of different channels of communication was the fact that the Programme's staff was given a central position. People want their information straight from the horse's mouth, and if your neighbour is a driver for the Programme, you ask him. This shows how vital it is for all staff members to fully grasp the Programme and its approach. Drivers and secretaries are just as likely as facilitators and managers to be the interface between the Programme and the community. If they do not understand the long-term development approach (if they can say what the programme does, but on a deeper level have not understood why it does so) they will not be able to explain it to their neighbours either. And since local staff members will remain in the community after the Programme has left, building their capacities is an investment in the long-term future.

Despite the limitations of the Information Project already mentioned, it would be foolish to completely discard the media-based information channels. The notice boards have the potential of reaching a large number of people. If the limitations of this channel are understood and it is used for simple and straightforward messages concentrating on activities and concrete results, it could be a tool in the toolbox.

The crucial point is that each tool should not be expected to address other things than it is designed for. A combination of tools, used in the right way, will achieve more than if applied separately. But for that, a strategy is needed, and an integrated, holistic approach must be adopted in which communication is not just added on as an isolated gimmick, expected to come with a "quick fix" to the problem.

CONCLUSION: IMPLICATIONS FOR OTHER DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMMES

The results of this study have been shaped by the specific conditions of Topola and Serbia in a precise moment in time. However, the central findings and analysis of this study are also relevant in other contexts. Based on the experiences of the TRDP, a successful communication strategy on programme level should include at least the following.

Early planning. Communication must be thought through at the planning stage of a programme. It should take into account the local context in terms of expectations and experiences as well as a broad range of communication channels. Being a tool, focus should be on how to use it effectively.

Know your target group. The communication strategy should take into account that different target groups have different needs to which communication should be adjusted. This is particularly important in the case of information campaigns.

Two-way process. Communication is more than just information. It entails a two-way process involving an exchange of messages (a dialogue). Quality feedback will help the programme become better. One-way messages can be part of the communication strategy, but rather as a complement.

Tool vs. objective. Different communication “axes” need to be dealt with separately. Communication as a means should not be mixed up with communication as an end in itself. Integrated part. The communication strategy should be an integrated part of the programme, and not a reserve for “experts”, since all those working for the programme play an important role in the dialogue with the community.

People-based. The most important communication channels in a development programme are people-based. Therefore all members of staff need to fully grasp the programme and be aware of the communication aspects. They should receive training in how to explain its aims and objectives to people with different backgrounds and levels of education.

Start off together. Although tensions between donor and implementing organisation always seem to be a factor, problems can be avoided if the two start off with a joint understanding of the communication challenges ahead and how each party best can contribute to the solution.

* A journalist, she is based in London, UK. She writes for Swedish papers and magazines, and is the UK correspondent for the daily *Sydsvenska Dagbladet*. In 1997-99 she worked as a field worker/information officer at the UNDP Integrated Resettlement Programme in Travnik, Bosnia-Herzegovina. This article is based on her Master thesis of the same title (February 2005). ulla@engberg.fsnet.co.uk

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[12] Waisbord (2000). P. 10, quoting Chapman Walsh et al 1993.

SUBMITTED BY: FLORENCIA ENGHEL

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