



DIGITAL COMMUNICATION FOR DEVELOPMENT IN NEPAL

An evaluation of the Digital Broadcast Initiative

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PROLOGUE

"Equal Access is a nonprofit organization that helps underserved populations in Asia. We accomplish this by combining cutting edge technology like digital satellite broadcasting and solar energy, with traditional communications technologies like national and community radio" (www.equalaccess.org)

I arrived in Nepal on January 7, 2004 to carry out an evaluation of the 18-month pilot project *Digital Broadcast Initiative*, designed and implemented by *Equal Access* in conjunction with UNDP-Southeast Asia. For almost three months, I met and interviewed listeners, partners and initiators of the Digital Broadcast Initiative (DBI).

I was granted a scholarship from the Swedish International Development Agency (SIDA) to carry out the study. *Equal Access* provided me with a working space in their offices in central Katmandu but did not, as agreed, pay me to develop the study. The both friendly and competent staff of *Equal Access-Nepal* warmly welcomed me. Thanks to their and their San Francisco-based colleagues' generosity with time and effort, I was able to make this study, which helped me understand more of the particularities and generalities of development communication.

Although for my survey I used a critical approach, I want to stress that the particular analysis of *Equal Access'* DBI-project in Nepal I will hereby discuss is not to be read as a "worst case scenario". It is my impression that the DBI is a functioning, perhaps even a successful sample, in a larger errant system. This particular project was simply my way of choice into the general field of development communication, which was the actual subject of my study.

POINT OF DEPARTURE

As I arrived in Katmandu, I was still unclear regarding the focus of my study. The first week in and around the *Equal Access* office in Katmandu, I kept my eyes wide open, trying to find the sphere of greatest interest for me. It did not take long. On the seventh day of my stay, an interview made it clear that communication in this network project did not function. Communication channels were clogged in and between every level. In short, that blurred sphere that project designers called “dialogue” - as illustrated in the graph on *Equal Access*’ official webpage and reproduced here- was nowhere to be found; and no one seemed to be too alarmed about it.

The project director later told me that there are only two questions that anyone in charge of that role really needs to be concerned about: prove that you can do what you set out to do, and show impact. But those two questions are all about what you communicate back to the funders, and not about making difference. Therefore, I asked myself why it is that indexes of statistics and graphs on a webpage seem to have grown more important than ongoing dialogue between those involved. And I found an overall system of *systematic misrecognition*.

THE PROJECT'S START

The DBI came to Nepal in the end of the 1990s. The project was not “made for” Nepal initially, but Southeast Asia in general and India in particular. However, complex Indian broadcasting regulations made such a project practically impossible. In that perspective, the chaotic kingdom of Nepal seemed simpler to penetrate, and was furthermore regarded as a potentially handsome showcase, as expressed by the then project coordinator during a meeting in January 2004.

By the end of the 1990s, the project was presented at workshops as a *participatory narrowcast digital initiative* to “bridge the digital divide and give equal access to information”. The idea was to have constant feedback from the targeted listeners, as the ever-changing form in which the adaptive content would be molded to keep the formats fresh and participation alive. Initially, the plan was thus not to broadcast development content to over 400 receivers in 54 districts of Nepal, but a small-scale trial of an innovative way of using digital media [1].

In 2001, the conceptual framework of a flagship drama circling around the

main character of Thuldidi, was agreed on, and the Katmandu-based production company *Communications Corner* was chosen for producing it. The Nepal DBI project was envisioned through an image of three interacting rings (see figure). One ring corresponded to *Outreach Partners*, another to *Assessment Partners*, and the third to *Content Partners*. This overall structure would keep the project upright during its pilot phase. In the middle, the three rings would interact in a sphere called “dialogue”.



Outreach partners

Outreach Partners consisted of those organizations *Equal Access* had chosen as their stand-ins for work on the ground. They were chosen “for their depth of experience and already established presence in the communities

being served” (DBI Baseline Assessment Document Nepal, 2003: p 2). These organizations were funded to gather listening groups and put receivers in place, orient the groups to the program, and train “facilitators”, one in each site, to facilitate not only listening but also discussions, and most notably how to deal with feedback modules. In order to do this, the *Assessment Partner* Valley Research Group (VaRG) held training for the Outreach Partners. However, the wrong people were trained, as will be discussed later. To the five core Outreach Partners - whose sites also constituted the focus of the baseline survey- two organizations related to other UNDP-led project were added, and another two governmental organizations were added upon a request from UNICEF. By accepting these additional organizations, *Equal Access* was to deliver more than 400 receivers, instead of the initially planned 150. Already before launch, the aims of the DBI project had thus grown to more than double.

Right before the project was about to be launched, *Communications Corner* made an analysis of the initial project plan and found that each program would cost 25 dollars per estimated listener to produce, if only digital narrowcast as planned. “What would be the benefit of it? There would have to be many more receivers to have an impact!” (from the director of *Communications Corner*, February 2004). The receivers, even though cheap on the global digital radio market, were over a hundred dollars each -very expensive from a Nepalese point of view.

Equal Access was thus convinced to add to the narrowcast-gone-broadcast a rebroadcast network of local FM stations. From Palpa in the west until Jhapa in the east, no less than ten FM-stations and nationwide Radio

Nepal were to rebroadcast the shows produced for the DBI project (there were no local FM-stations broadcasting over the far west.). Thus, DBI would now reach most of it's listeners on analogue airwaves.

Communications Corner was just in the process of building up a network of local FM stations for its own commercial productions, and benefited from the possibility to offer the DBI-programs as a bonus in negotiations. However, it was clear that this would also benefit the DBI project, not least given the fact that most of the digital radio receivers got stuck in the Nepali customs for a couple of months after launching. As a consequence, the first period of the project rested solely on the rebroadcast on analogue airwaves over those parts of Nepal where FM-stations were already aplenty.

Nepal is divided in five main areas: east, central, west, mid west and far west. The core Outreach Partners were active in the western, central and eastern Nepal; the focus of the project was not –as it was said initially– the mid and far west. There are surely remote poverty struck villages in the west-central-eastern parts, as well as prevalence of HIV/AIDS and trafficking. But since the rebroadcast scheme was decided for, given the fact that the bulk of both commercial and community FM-stations are to be found in these west-central-east regions, and as the digital radio receivers were finally delivered, some people had a variety of channels to hear the same messages, while those initially chosen to be the target audiences had none.

Assessment -and the resulting BAD

The *Assessment Partners* were envisioned to consist of an in-country monitoring team, the Valley Research Group (VaRG), and The University of California, San Francisco, Center for AIDS Prevention. The latter would assist the former in establishing a standard measurement for the impact of the project, and the former would carry out the actual monitoring. The Assessment Partners were “chosen on the basis of their experience and skills in establishing baseline data, undertaking ongoing monitoring and assessments, conducting evaluations of health initiatives and community based projects and projects involving media and community awareness” (DBI Baseline Assessment Document Nepal, 2003: p. 3).

Two experts from UCLA were indeed flown over to Katmandu during startup to assist with the questionnaire of the baseline survey [2]. The proportion of what this external expertise charged for the swift consultancy turned out to be inappropriate in comparison to the rest of the budget, and the collaboration with UCLA has since faded out. Their most important role - giving the newborn project an “academic touch”, as the project director bluntly told me- had already been invested in. The

questionnaire was made, and the in-country monitoring team went out in July-August 2002, to collect the data for the first benchmark of knowledge, attitudes and behaviors (KAB) among the targeted audience.

According to the introduction of the Baseline Assessment Document Nepal 2003 (finished in January 2004), the survey was carried out on the six districts along the southern-central-eastern belt of the Terai and Inner Terai. "These areas suffer from a lack of infrastructure and have been selected on the basis of the development indicators including low literacy rates and high population mobility. These areas are thus more susceptible to the spread of HIV and to escalating HIV transmission to other Nepalese regions" (DBI Baseline Assessment Document Nepal, 2003: p. 4).

However, through a comparison of the demographics of the baseline survey and national censuses developed in the last couple of decades, a peculiar mismatch was made obvious. For example, I was surprised to find that 97 percent of adolescent boys and 93 percent of adolescent girls in the survey were said to be literate, as was 90.5 adult men and 52.6 percent of the adult women. In 1991, the national literacy average was 39.9 percent according to the national Central Bureau of Statistics' census.

These literacy rates strike as even more surprising if we consider the fact that the survey was supposed to be carried out among those who "suffer from a lack of infrastructure and have been selected on the basis of the development indicators including low literacy rates and high population mobility", as stated in the Baseline Assessment Document (which I will call BAD).

A possible explanation of these rates could be variations in definition of "literacy". The censuses of 1952/54, 1961 and 1971 all interpreted the term "literacy" as the "ability to read and write in any language." In the 1981 census "with understanding" was added, and the 1991 census defined it "as ability to read and write with understanding and to do simple arithmetic calculations" (DBI Baseline Assessment Document Nepal, 2003: p. 93).

How was literacy defined in the BAD survey? As the ability to check a box or sign a name? The almost complete literacy among survey respondents could also signify a squandering focus on the chosen sample. How was the survey carried out? Did participation perhaps require literacy, as in the feedback modules? Was it carried out as a questionnaire on paper, rather than qualitative interviews, for swiftness and effectiveness?

Strange enough, no one could recall for sure how it had been done when I came around one and a half year later (leading me to think that it might have simplified their job to let educated, literate respondents engaged in

media and politics make up the basis of the baseline survey that was already late and urgently needed to obtain further funding). Indeed, their hurried assembly of data cannot have been an easy piece. The VaRG interviewers carried out the interviews during a combination of heavy monsoon, harvest season and State of Emergency, which could have lessened interviewees' willingness to participate. They did not use the Outreach Partners' presence in the fields for "gate-keeping", but rather trusted their own knowledge in how to build rapport. As noted in the BAD, respondents tended to be suspicious of the curious outsiders, and many bluntly refused participating, as locally active project workers told me.

Feedback on the Project

Apart from the Baseline Assessment, VaRG was supposed to conduct a "periodic monitoring" of the DBI project. This continuous monitoring would take place "every fourth month during the life of the project", and consist of data collected by every NGO Outreach Partner organizations representatives. Ideally, representatives would be those already trained by VaRG in Katmandu. But not even in one case was training given to any of the people who were actually going to be active in the field. "We never get invitations from Katmandu", one of them told me.

The interpretation of the concept of "facilitation" was not the same among local Outreach Partners of the DBI as in *Equal Access* San Francisco. At least from what I gathered, "facilitation" for those actually involved seemed to consist of putting on the radio at the time of the show. In a few sites, the "facilitator" or, as it were, a (literate) relative of the "facilitator", had filled in feedback forms once or twice –for the whole group– at leisure time. In others, no one had even heard about any feedback form or any other way of reporting. They did not know their opinions mattered. In the official plan, training and funding for a district supervisor was to be given by UNDP. This supervisor would instruct a "facilitator" in each group of how to "facilitate" discussions and gather feedback from the group members.

This did not happen. However, had someone made sure that these UNDP-trained "supervisors" were the same as the "representatives" responsible for collecting data for VaRG and other partner organizations, and had these been paid with the funds from *Equal Access*... would things have turned out differently? As late as January 2004, VaRG had not been able to conduct even one single periodic monitoring, since no data at all had come in from the Outreach Partner organizations. Admittedly, they had not asked for it either. In the *Equal Access* office in Katmandu – as late as January 2004 - this was news.

Feedback on Content

“We waited for 25 episodes – didn’t receive any feedback forms. We did receive letters from local FM stations, from individual listeners that heard the rebroadcasts. Still, we don’t get enough, nor timely feedback from the organized” channels. Only twice we have had feedback forms sent to us” (from the director of *Communications Corner*, February 2004).

Feedback on content did not, like the “periodic monitoring”, happen at all during the first year. One of many reasons was that even though the project was officially launched, the actual radio receivers were locked-up in the customs for months. As they finally reached the sites, monsoon had hit Nepal, and a weak link between the antenna and the cable was damaged by humidity. In some sites, bad weather struck even harder – electric lightning found the way to the antenna, and the radios were simply fried: the strike of lightning resulted in a malfunctioning chip. Information concerning rebroadcasts on FM network did not seem to have gone through to listeners. Thus, no listening + no discussions = no feedback.

Another reason was that the prefabricated forms -if filled in at all, which happened only rarely- they got stuck at local Outreach Partner offices, at central offices, and finally at *Equal Access*’ own Katmandu office, before reaching their goal –which they never did.

In January 2004, after my surprisingly revealing meeting with the VaRG, two staff members of *Equal Access*-Nepal began touring the Outreach districts to train the facilitators on “how to gather feedback”. The bureaucratic moves along the trail of offices mentioned above were not addressed during my stay.

However important “feedback” and “participation” are for the project plan, they need not be crucial for the show. Neither lack of feedback nor delay of radio receivers did stop the Content Team to continue producing the show, and according to the director of *Communications Corner*, “content would not have been different even if feedback channels had functioned”. The idea of keeping content flexible according to listener’s feedback was thus abandoned already in the early autumn of 2003.

Gone at that early stage of the project was also the only woman in the content group, who refused to stay and –I quote her own words- “break her head against the wall”. She quit the group because she thought the project had nothing to do with what she had envisioned initially. “There was no feedback coming in, and no one seemed to care too much about

that. There was no interactivity with listeners, but there was a bunch of Katmandu-based male experts brainstorming about what remote villagers needed to know”, she told me in March 2004.

Feedback from listeners: a competition

In the spring of 2004, as the failure of the feedback module was made aware to all parts, a competition among the listeners was decided on to enhance listener’s interactivity. The topic of the competition was “How should a person affected with HIV live?”, and the best answer would be rewarded with a digital radio. But how should a person affected with HIV live? This is a very complex and highly speculative question, very difficult to assess and award. As responses came in, the *Communications Corner* could not decide who would win. The obvious “most correct” answer ended with the sentence “People with HIV should not have sex”, which could not be awarded.

I was not around long enough to find out who won the radio in the end, but the sheer inflow of letters from listeners was regarded among the involved project organizations as a success, and with a different question, the concept might have turned out to be an effective way to enhance listeners’ participation.

Content

Donors had earmarked their money for particular development topics, which in large reflect the current development scene, globally. HIV/AIDS, trafficking, women’s empowerment, early child development, sanitation, etcetera. These developmental buzzwords were however in the DBI project neatly embroidered into a local environment, through the creative process of script writing and content advisory discussions.

The topics were weaved into the dramatic events of the imaginary village of Sundipur –a general mid-Nepali hill-village, which implies that the majority of the people living in Sundipur would be Hindus of the two upper castes. The ring called Content was set up along a Production Team, a Content Advisory Group (CAG) and an independent scriptwriter. The content advisors consisted of one male expert on education, one male medical doctor and one male social economist, as well as “the mother of Thuldidi”, the woman who had pitched the conceptual central character of the drama, who however quit after a while. Additionally, meetings involved the male scriptwriter, the male drama director and the male chairperson of the *Communications Corner*, all from the same Bahun caste. To represent *Equal Access* the (male) UN-volunteer would also

attend, in order to make sure that the objectives preferred by the donors were met.

Topics

The general objectives in terms of content were to follow the preferences of the donors. HIV/AIDS is not (yet) epidemic in Nepal, but the prevalence is growing fast in patches, among migrant workers, long distance truck drivers, prostitutes and not least among young drug-abusers. Awareness on transmission modes is generally well known, since “all stations have information on HIV/AIDS, these days” as one interviewee expressed it, sighing with boredom. But the stigmatization around HIV/AIDS is a great problem to tackle. Even among well-trained health workers, people living with HIV/AIDS are avoided, or kept separately. In some hospitals, there are warning signs -“AIDS!”- hanging over the beds of patients with HIV/AIDS.

Trafficking has been a big industry in Nepal for 15-20 years. Young girls and boys are lured out of their villages, out of Nepal, often to Mumbai, and forced into prostitution in brothels or circuses. As they test positive to HIV or show signs of AIDS, they are sent back home. However, heavy awareness campaigns on trafficking have lessened the numbers greatly since the mid 1990s, and on March 20, 2004, a headline in the daily newspaper *The Himalayan Times* read, “Trafficking no more a burning issue!” Of course, one may presume the issue is not burning anymore because of an even more on fire sociopolitical context. The acceleration of the conflict between the People’s Army (Maoist) and the Royal Army currently makes all other issues fade, and considering the circumstances for young people in Nepal, one can hardly blame anyone desperately searching for a living abroad, or indulging in drugs for that sake (which all too often lead to increased vulnerability for HIV/AIDS). The conflict, however, was not a topic in the content of the DBI-programming.

There was no space for politics, controversial issues or news on the WorldSpace satellite, and the main funder and collaborator, UNDP, was not willing to be part of anything that could be seen as controversial. And considering the fine balances any actor or participant has to keep being active in areas polarized by the two conflicting parties, neutrality seems to be a dear card to play. But does neutrality equal silence? Are there not sources behind the uprising of the conflict that could be addressed without getting involved in politics proper? [3]

Relevance

A great number of interviewees stated that awareness rising on HIV/AIDS

was surely very important, but that there was not really anyone living with HIV/AIDS in their community, a reason why it did not feel like urgent information. Indeed, the prevalence of HIV/AIDS is not very high in Nepal, even if rising. Almost everyone interviewed, however, suffered from other problems such as poverty, illiteracy, unemployment, failing harvests and unsafe drinking water, making up a general picture that could indeed lead to a faster growth of a potential HIV epidemic.

Cannot HIV/AIDS be prevented also by supporting people to make a living without resorting to desperate means? How about some income generating training, they asked me? How about some really useful subjects on the radio that could practically change their daily lives? The programs on health and sanitation are popular, but sometimes too complex. Medical terms are used that only trained nurses or accomplished English speakers can understand, and focus is too often set on diseases like cancer, HIV and TBC. "During harvest, for example, people cut themselves. There is a lot of information on cancer and tuberculosis; interviews on the radio with experts answering questions, but there is no BASIC everyday health info on the radio. There is no initiative on that" (a female health worker in Basamadi, Makwanpur)

Cuts happen especially during harvest - could one imagine a schedule of topics that followed the seasons and particular professions and practices? At least as an addition to the topics of more general character chosen by donors from the other side of the world...

Notably, a few listeners mentioned "asthma" as a topic of the KKM. However, later I learnt that there had not been a single episode dealing with asthma. According to the director of the production company, the word may have been mentioned once or twice, but nothing more than that. As I found this out too late, I could not investigate the reason for this oddly common reply. Could it have been mixed up with something broadcasted on other channels? Or could this be an indication that listeners pick up on what they feel is relevant for them, however briefly mentioned?

Kura Khasra Mita (KKM), or "Let's talk straight"

Sundipur is an imaginary village, meant to be viable for all Nepalese. But there was of course a role model for its development. The scriptwriter told me he based his imaginary outcome on the eastern hilly village of his childhood. He then tried to strip it from particularities and add others, to make it into "some other village". This "streamlining" surely meets the majority ethnic groups of the people, but when talking to Tharu listeners of the Terai, the Hindu concept of the heroine, "thuldidi" [4], was not

familiar in their communities. Of course, one character cannot be like all and everyone, but we can reflect on what particulars she was given, and what imprints that leaves on listeners' imagination.

Who is Thuldidi?

To all KKM-listeners I met, it was clear that Thuldidi was a social worker, but not a professional, someone who could afford being a voluntary. According to the director of Communications Corner, Thuldidi is Chhettri, because if she was Brahmin (or Bahun as this top caste is called in the Nepali hills), the "Janajati" (basically "all the others", not Chhettri or Bahun) would be annoyed, and if she was "Janajati" the Brahmins would be annoyed. The reader should note that figures from the 1991 census where 16.1 percent of the population is said to be Chhetri, and 12.9 percent Brahmin/Bahun, making up 29 percent of the population. Consider also the location of the majority of the DBI sites, in Terai and Inner Terai districts where only Chitwan and Morang show a majority of the two upper castes.

Of all the people I interviewed, more than 80 percent thought Thuldidi was a Brahmin/Bahun. They heard it in the way she spoke, they said. And in the way she spoke of equality but practiced something else [5]. Some thought she was Chhettri. Very few suggested anything else. Does it matter what caste she is? It is my point of view that having yet another authoritative voice on the radio educating and advising people and being generally knowledgeable (albeit unprofessional), being a Brahmin (albeit female), does not help change the norm of the bikas (development) of the nationalization-project of the Panchayat years [6]: the very same ignorance of difference that is often referred to as a major cause of the fast growth of the insurgency. Nor would it make the show particularly relevant for "all the others" or make them feel "empowered" by the strength of Thuldidi.

Notably, the one village I visited where the KKM had really had an impact was in where the listeners were eastern hill Bahuns, just as Thuldidi and her imaginary neighbors, whereas most Tharu-listeners all across the nation seemed not to pay the show very little attention.

TO CONCLUDE

A promise not fulfilled

In the last decades, the development industry has grown fond of universal

impact measurement modules, stripped of local peculiarities and intended for global comparison. Bare numbers come handy for those who are dealing with donors. But in a context of such complexity as the Nepalese, and with such varieties of activity on the ground as in the DBI project, perhaps the quantitative method developed by the academic experts of UCLA -to be carried out by local interviewers with a shortage of time and in hard conditions- did not really fit. An extensive qualitative research should have been carried out before making up the quantitative survey, from my point of view. Considering the fact that the survey expert designers came all the way from California, knowledge of the particular context seems to have been understated.

Could there have been other ways to structure feedback channels, than through prefabricated forms that both require literacy and that may give an awesome impression of “authority”, as well as risk getting stuck in the “bureaucratic” process of being filed and transferred from one office to another? Perhaps also the creative processes could spare space allotted for listeners’ “unprofessional” feedback to actually make a difference in production. Then perhaps the proud promise on the *Equal Access* official webpage would make more sense: “This practical and inclusive approach ensures that local needs are genuinely addressed and that Nepalese organizations are supported in “owning” all parts of the initiative”.

From a distorted pilot study to a successful production house

The DBI-project was from the beginning supposed to be a 18 month pilot of digital narrowcast on a targeted audience of primarily adolescent girls in the far west, according to the Baseline Assessment Document (DBI-Nepal, 2003).

Long before the first program was on air, the narrowcast had turned into broadcast, and an analogue network of FM stations had been added to the digital component.

The adolescent girls had been crowded out by adult women, and focus was moved from the wild, wild west to the “not so scary” central and eastern parts of Nepal. Only to finally let in the men of the west, with the subsequent inclusion of the local production organization, FOLD. A scalable project indeed!

Today, *Equal Access*-Nepal is registered as a national NGO, and the Katmandu office is growing fast. In January 2006, the office contained a staff of around 20 employed, in-house experts, in-house producers and even their own radio jockeys. They do not rely solely on the outreach

partners to reach out any longer, but travel around from time to time themselves to “interact” with potential listeners. By the end of 2005, multimedia stations were introduced for the first time in a number of sites, with a set on first and foremost education. There are new programs on Human Rights, Cultural Affairs and Early Childhood Development, Good Governance and even Conflict Resolution.

The former major content production company, *Communications Corner*, has purchased their own satellite channel, wherefrom they broadcast news and entertainment over most parts of Nepal –something that led to the imprisonment of the director along with other media editors after the coup of the King in February 2005, to be released a couple of months later. The smaller production company, FOLD, is still making reports on and about the far west, where there are still no local FM-stations. *Equal Access* has exported the DBI project to Cambodia, Laos, India, Tajikistan and Afghanistan.

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[1] The digital radio market has been unsuccessful in the West, where much cheaper pc-, mp3- and telecom-solutions already provide digital audio along with other useful functions. Except for Britain, sales of the so-called digital audio broadcasting (DAB) radios have been too low to make their high prices competitive. The cynic could read this “innovative use for humanitarian causes” as a try of an unsuccessful industry in the West to seek commercial interest elsewhere.

[2] This survey was to establish the “benchmark” to which a midterm and an end term survey would be compared, the “impact” thus subtracted. However, in May 2004, there was no schedule for a midterm survey, and no one could say who would carry it out, nor how or when.

[3] Humor is a brilliant de-aggravator, and makes it possible to deal with hot subjects in a cool way. In the radio show Chhinophano, produced by Antenna Foundation for Radio Nepal, two popular comedians talk, joking about serious current affairs. In one year, the show has become tremendously popular. In my interviews with DBI listeners, many complained that there was not enough “jokes” on the DBI broadcasts. Antenna Foundation was at the time about to start up collaboration with DBI.

[4] “Thuldidi” means “elder sister” in Nepali, and normally implies an older woman in the family, extended family or neighborhood, who pokes into all and everything in a caring, loving way.

[5] Particularly one episode was mentioned as revealing: when Thuldidi’s “dai” (brother) wants to get married to a girl whose grandgrand father was a cobbler of a Dalit caste, Thuldidi is shocked to hear the news and strongly advises him not to do it.

[6] For almost half a century the project of nation building was tightly intertwined with development messages streamlining the heterogeneous Nepali population into the norm of the Nepali speaking Hindu; including the foreign aid industry leading an oppressed “Nepali woman” to “empower”. See Seira Tamang, *Developing the Nepali woman*, 2003.



